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QUASI CAMPAIGN FINANCE
NICHOLAS O. STEPHANOPOULOS†
ABSTRACT
Say you’re wealthy and want to influence American politics. How
would you do it? Conventional campaign finance—giving or spending
money to sway elections—is one option. Lobbying is another. This
Article identifies and explores a third possibility: quasi campaign
finance, or spending money on nonelectoral communications with
voters that nevertheless rely on an electoral mechanism to be effective.
Little is currently known about quasi campaign finance because no law
requires its disclosure. But its use by America’s richest and politically
savviest individuals—the Koch brothers, Michael Bloomberg, and the
like—appears to be rising. It also seems to skew policy outcomes in the
spenders’ preferred direction.
After introducing quasi campaign finance, the Article considers its
legal status. Is it like ordinary campaign finance, in which case it could
be regulated fairly extensively? Or is it like garden-variety political
speech, rendering it presumptively unregulable? One argument for
pairing quasi and regular campaign finance is that they share several
features—who bankrolls them, the tactics they pay for, the reasons they
work—and so may serve as substitutes. Another rationale for
conflation is that they may both cause the same democratic injuries:
corruption, the distortion of public opinion, and the misalignment of
public policy. Pitted against these points is the slippery-slope objection:
If quasi campaign finance may constitutionally be curbed, what
political speech may not be?
Lastly, the Article suggests how quasi campaign finance should
(assuming it actually may) be regulated. Limits on contributions and
expenditures are unwise and probably unadministrable. Disclosure,
though, is a necessity. The public should know who is trying to
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persuade it (and how). Even more promising is the public
subsidization of quasi campaign finance. If every voter received a
voucher for this purpose, then public funds might crowd out private
capital, thus alleviating its harmful effects.
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INTRODUCTION
On any given day—whether an election is imminent or not—
hundreds of Americans for Prosperity (“AFP”) activists knock on
thousands of voters’ doors. Each encounter follows much the same
script. The AFP activist pitches a message of small-government
conservativism: lower taxes, less spending, less regulation, fewer
entitlements, and so on. The AFP activist also asks for the voter’s views
on a variety of topics and collects the voter’s contact information. This
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data will be used in the future to encourage the voter to act in some
way: to write to her representative, to attend a protest, to donate
money, or to support a certain candidate.1
AFP does more than proselytize on behalf of libertarianism. The
organization also mobilizes the electorate around particular issues.
When the Obama administration proposed a cap-and-trade policy to
combat climate change, for example, AFP “sent ‘Carbon Cops,’ who
pranced into Tea Party rallies pretending to be overreaching emissaries
from the EPA.”2 AFP also “launched what it called the Cost of Hot
Air Tour,” featuring “a seventy-foot-tall bright red hotair balloon on
whose side was emblazoned a [derogatory] slogan.” 3 Likewise,
whenever a state considers expanding Medicaid eligibility, the local
AFP chapter springs into action. It runs “expensive ads decrying
Medicaid expansion,” “organize[s] rallies and demonstrations,” and
“canvasse[s] the districts of [legislators] who tried to compromise.”4
These AFP efforts—as well as similar ones by many other
groups—are notable in several respects. First, they are not explicitly
electoral. They usually do not refer to candidates and may take place
even when the next election is still far off. Second, the communications
do have overt policy goals. They promote either a general ideology or
a stance on a specific issue. And third, the mechanism through which
the communications hope to achieve their policy goals is electoral. The
idea is that politicians may be induced to behave in certain ways by
voters’ nonelectoral mobilization because that nonelectoral energy
could easily become electoral when the next campaign comes around.
American law does not know what to make of this activity.
Though it has an electoral connection, it is beyond the scope of
campaign finance statutes. Those statutes apply only to
communications that mention candidates in certain periods or that
1. See, e.g., Matea Gold, Americans for Prosperity Plows Millions into Building
Conservative Ground Force, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/americans-for-prosperity-plows-millions-into-building-conservative-ground-force/2014/10/
06/692469b6-4b35-11e4-b72e-d60a9229cc10_story.html [https://perma.cc/H9XJ-P642]; Michael J.
Mishak & Philip Elliott, Americans for Prosperity Builds Political Machine, LEDGER (Oct. 11,
2014, 10:46 PM), https://www.theledger.com/news/20141011/americans-for-prosperity-buildspolitical-machine-for-2016-races/1 [https://perma.cc/NG6N-DP6R].
2. JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE BILLIONAIRES BEHIND
THE RISE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT 265–66 (2017).
3. Id. at 266.
4. Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Theda Skocpol & Daniel Lynch, Business Associations,
Conservative Networks, and the Ongoing Republican War over Medicaid Expansion, 41 J.
HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 239, 266 (2016) (describing the tactics of AFP-Virginia).
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advocate their election or defeat.5 Nor do lobbying regulations extend
to the activity, though it often involves requests that voters contact
their representatives. Grassroots interactions with politicians, unlike
direct lobbying, do not have to be disclosed.6 Tax law, too, fails to shed
much light on the activity, though much of it is conducted by nonprofit
groups that are required to file detailed returns.7 A series of loopholes
render these returns only mildly informative.8
My initial objective in this Article, then, is to introduce the concept
of quasi campaign finance and to describe the little that is known about
it. Quasi campaign finance, like conventional campaign finance, pays
for political communications with voters. But with quasi campaign
finance, unlike with ordinary campaign finance, these communications
are nonelectoral yet rely on an electoral link to be effective. Little is
known about quasi campaign finance because no law demands its
disclosure. Individuals, corporations, unions, and nonprofits may thus
fund quasi campaign finance without informing any authority of their
disbursements. If “dark money” is electoral spending whose amount is
known but whose source is not,9 then quasi campaign finance is even
more opaque—black money whose sums and origins are mostly a
mystery.
Only mostly, though. Thanks to the dogged efforts of political
scientists, we know a bit about the volume, drivers, and effects of quasi
campaign finance. Its annual amount has been conservatively
estimated at three quarters of a billion dollars; the true figure is likely
somewhat higher.10 Quasi campaign finance is therefore in the same
spending league as regular campaign finance and lobbying, which each
total about $3 billion annually, but have commanded far more
regulatory and scholarly attention. The biggest spenders on quasi
campaign finance are wealthy and ideologically extreme individuals.
AFP’s annual outlays of over $100 million, for instance, are funded by
5. See 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3) (2018); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43–44 (1976) (per
curiam).
6. See 2 U.S.C. § 1604 (2018).
7. See I.R.S. Schedule C (Form 990 or 990-EZ), Political Campaign and Lobbying Activities
(OMB No. 1545-0047) (2019) [hereinafter Form 990 Schedule C], https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/f990sc.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQ9S-EAML].
8. See infra notes 50–54 and accompanying text.
9. See Political Nonprofits (Dark Money), CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL. (Oct. 1, 2020),
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/nonprof_summ.php [https://perma.cc/3SD9-FVBH].
10. See, e.g., Drew Dimmery & Andrew Peterson, Shining the Light on Dark Money:
Political Spending by Nonprofits, 2 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 51, 64–65 (2016)
[hereinafter Dimmery & Peterson, Shining the Light].
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the Koch brothers and their affiliated right-wing network.11 And these
spenders appear to see quasi campaign finance as a partial substitute
for conventional campaign finance. When the latter is more heavily
restricted, more money flows to the former, and vice versa.12
Interestingly, quasi campaign finance does not seem to move
public opinion significantly.13 This may be because its usual aim is to
raise an issue’s salience, not to change voters’ minds. Or it may be
because it typically targets a narrow slice of the electorate: older, better
educated, and more affluent voters. 14 However, quasi campaign
finance evidently does influence the behavior of elected officials. 15
They may (wrongly) think that it is shifting voters’ views—and then
alter their own positions to be more congruent with (what they believe
to be) the electorate’s. Or politicians may (rightly) worry that any
group that can mobilize the public around a nonelectoral issue can also
do so come election time. After all, the same techniques characterize
quasi and ordinary campaign finance; the main difference is the
message.16
The complex relationship between quasi and regular campaign
finance motivates my second inquiry in this Article: probing whether,
legally, quasi campaign finance is more like regular campaign finance
or the vast domain of public discourse. A great deal hinges on the
answer to this question. Conventional campaign finance may be
regulated through disclosure requirements, contribution limits, and
formerly—but maybe again if the Supreme Court’s composition
changes—expenditure caps. This is because ordinary campaign finance
is arguably part of the bounded institution of elections: a delimited area
where the state may regulate speech to promote the institution’s ends.
In contrast, public discourse is generally deemed unregulable under the
First Amendment tradition. As Professor Robert Post has written,

11. See, e.g., Gold, supra note 1.
12. See, e.g., Robert E. Hogan, State Campaign Finance Laws and Interest Group
Electioneering Activities, 67 J. POL. 887, 901 (2005).
13. See infra notes 144–53 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., KENNETH M. GOLDSTEIN, INTEREST GROUPS, LOBBYING, AND
PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA 115–16 (1999).
15. See, e.g., Daniel E. Bergan, Does Grassroots Lobbying Work? A Field Experiment
Measuring the Effects of an e-Mail Lobbying Campaign on Legislative Behavior, 37 AM. POL.
RSCH. 327, 340 (2009) (“The models show that the e-mail lobbying campaign influenced legislative
voting behavior on the two pivotal roll calls.”).
16. See, e.g., id. at 329 (discussing the reasons why quasi campaign finance may influence
legislators).
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“[W]ithin public discourse, speech must be kept free in order
democratically to determine what [society’s] goals should be.”17
The contemporary Court would no doubt assign quasi campaign
finance to the realm of public discourse. Indeed, the contemporary
Court has edged ever closer to classifying regular campaign finance as
public discourse—and thus obliterating any legal distinction between
elections writ small and politics writ large. 18 Consistent with other
scholarship,19 though, my premise here is that elections and politics do
meaningfully differ: that the former may be structured and
administered in ways that would be impermissible for the latter. If this
premise is granted, then the legal status of quasi campaign finance
becomes a difficult and fascinating issue. The law must then decide
whether it fits better in the electoral domain (despite its nonelectoral
content) or in public discourse (despite its reliance on future campaigns
for its impact).
From a functional perspective, this is not actually a dilemma. As
no less an authority than Charles Koch has explained, quasi and
conventional campaign finance serve the same ultimate purpose.
“Education,” “grassroots organizations,” “lobbying,” and “political
action” all aim “[t]o bring about social change,” and so constitute “a
strategy that is vertically and horizontally integrated.”20 Yet the claim
that quasi campaign finance is legally like ordinary campaign finance
because a funder may substitute one activity for the other surely proves
too much. For example, Charles Koch also advances his agenda
through think tanks, university centers, and media organs.21 But no one
would consider these entities to be part of the electoral domain. If they
17. ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE
CONSTITUTION 81 (2014).
18. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 516 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(“What separates issue advocacy and political advocacy is a line in the sand drawn on a windy
day.” (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 126 n.16 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010))).
19. See generally, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1998) (distinguishing between elections specifically and politics generally);
Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1751
(1999) [hereinafter Briffault, Issue Advocacy] (same); Burt Neuborne, The Supreme Court and
Free Speech: Love and a Question, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 789 (1998) (same); Frederick Schauer &
Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803
(1999) (same).
20. MAYER, supra note 2, at 173.
21. See generally MAYER, supra note 2 (discussing Koch’s multipronged initiatives); Theda
Skocpol & Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, The Koch Network and Republican Party Extremism,
14 PERSP. ON POL. 681 (2016) (same).
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could be labeled electoral due to their interchangeability with
campaign finance, then little would remain of public discourse.
Another argument for equating quasi and regular campaign
finance is that they both may distort public opinion. For many years,
the Court recognized “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth” on voters’ choices at the polls. 22 If those
decisions can be distorted by conventional campaign finance, it stands
to reason that voters’ policy stances can be skewed by quasi campaign
finance. As noted above, however, there is an empirical problem with
this proposition. Quasi campaign finance does not greatly sway public
opinion.23 A deeper difficulty is that if quasi campaign finance may be
regulated because of its effects on voters, then so may be any
communications that are persuasive thanks to their heavy funding. The
anti-distortion argument thus also imperils the special place of public
discourse in First Amendment law.
A further reason to treat quasi and ordinary campaign finance
symmetrically is their impact on politicians (as opposed to voters). In
previous work, I have shown that legislators’ records mirror their
donors’ preferences but diverge widely from what their constituents
want. 24 Similarly, as observed earlier, quasi campaign finance exerts
considerable influence on elected officials, inclining them toward the
funders’ positions and away from the electorate’s.25 But the Court has
never accepted the misalignment of representatives’ and voters’ views
as a justification for curbing protected speech. One might also worry
again about slippery slopes. If quasi campaign finance earns the same
legal status as regular campaign finance because of its misaligning
potential, then so might other political messages that threaten, too, to
drive a wedge between politicians and their constituents.
As this sketch illustrates, I am conflicted about the legal place of
quasi campaign finance. For every analogy between it and
conventional campaign finance, there is a counterpoint that, actually,
it more closely resembles public discourse. Nevertheless, my final aim
in this Article is to explore the regulatory implications if quasi and

22. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Com., 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990), overruled by Citizens United,
558 U.S. at 319.
23. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
24. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance Law, 101 VA. L. REV.
1425, 1467–86 (2015) [hereinafter Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance].
25. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
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ordinary campaign finance were ultimately paired. In that case, how
should quasi campaign finance be managed?
The default tools of regular campaign finance law—limits on
contributions and expenditures—seem inapt. In the quasi campaign
finance context, there are no donations to candidates to restrict.
Ceilings on spending would also face formidable issues of
administrability: where to set the caps, how to deal with proliferating
groups, which disbursements to count, and so on. Disclosure, however,
is a more plausible option. At present, little is known about who pays
for quasi campaign finance, how much money is spent, or where this
money goes. If this data were produced, as it is for conventional
campaign finance, then voters would learn which actors are trying to
mobilize them and with what resources. This information could be even
more useful to rival groups, who could offset the disclosed activities
with renewed efforts of their own.
But the most intriguing idea, in my view, is the public subsidization
of quasi campaign finance. In particular, I envision a voucher program
of the sort that scholars have long advocated,26 and municipalities have
begun to implement,27 in the ordinary campaign finance arena. Under
such a program, each voter would receive a small annual sum (say
$100), which the voter could then spend directly on quasi-electoral
activities or contribute to a group engaged in these efforts. The policy’s
appeal is that it would significantly allay concerns about distortion and
misalignment. If quasi campaign finance were largely paid for by the
people themselves, it would push public opinion toward, not away
from, a benchmark of free and equal participation. Likewise, it would
motivate politicians to shift their positions in the direction of the
electorate’s, since their humble constituents would now be the source
of most quasi-electoral funding.
The Article takes the following route. Part I is a descriptive
account of quasi campaign finance. I define the term, provide more
examples of it, and summarize what is known about its volume, drivers,
and effects. Part II is then the Article’s legal core. I carefully consider
the arguments for treating quasi and regular campaign finance
equivalently, and, conversely, for assigning quasi campaign finance to
the realm of public discourse. I also discuss other classificatory options,

26. See generally, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW
PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2002) (advancing a voucher proposal).
27. See, e.g., Democracy Voucher Program, SEATTLE.GOV, http://www.seattle.gov/democracy
voucher/about-the-program [https://perma.cc/SG5D-MHT2].

STEPHANOPOULOS IN PRINTER FINAL(DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

10/16/2020 12:50 PM

QUASI CAMPAIGN FINANCE

341

like situating quasi campaign finance in a bounded domain of
policymaking. Lastly, Part III returns from theory to practice. I
propose and assess a series of regulations that could be applied to quasi
campaign finance—assuming it is, in fact, regulable.
One more note before proceeding: because quasi campaign
finance has not previously been studied in any depth, the approach of
this Article is necessarily exploratory and contingent. I say as much as
can fairly be said about the subject, given our current knowledge about
it. But I hope that future research will expand and deepen what we
know about nonelectoral, yet still political, messages to voters. And as
our understanding shifts, so, I expect, will my descriptive and
normative claims about quasi campaign finance. These claims are
preliminary, at present, not set in stone.
I. THE CONTOURS OF QUASI CAMPAIGN FINANCE
Judge Richard Posner once referred to certain companies as
“political hermaphrodites” because of their penchant for donating
money to candidates from both major parties. 28 Quasi campaign
finance is also politically hermaphroditic, albeit for a different reason.
It straddles not the partisan line between Democrats and Republicans
but rather the conceptual boundary between elections and politics. My
goal in this Part, then, is to gain some theoretical and empirical
purchase on this hybrid activity. I first define quasi campaign finance
as funding for communications with voters that are nonelectoral yet rely
on an electoral mechanism to be effective. After showing how this
definition distinguishes quasi campaign finance from existing legal
categories, I describe several more cases of it. AFP and other Kochbacked groups are today’s highest-profile funders of quasi-electoral
communications, though wealthy liberal individuals and organizations
are now also entering the fray.
In the balance of the Part, I scour the academic literature—of
which surprisingly little is relevant—and present its findings about the
scale, causes, and consequences of quasi campaign finance. As to its
scale, it is comparable to, if somewhat less voluminous than,
conventional campaign finance. As to its causes, more money flows
into quasi campaign finance when ordinary electoral funding is limited,
when issues are salient, and when groups seek to disrupt the status quo.
And as to its consequences, quasi campaign finance appears to have a

28. LaFalce v. Houston, 712 F.2d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1983).
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greater impact on elected officials than on voters. It induces politicians
to move in the funders’ preferred direction, while it stimulates but
seldom convinces the public.
A. Definition
Several pieces of my definition for quasi campaign finance require
explication.29 Start with the first word: funding. In the regular campaign
finance context, the focus is on the money that is deployed in elections,
not the messages the money is used to disseminate.30 This is because it
is the money that may give rise to corruption, distortion, misalignment,
and other democratic harms. The messages, in contrast, are simply
political speech, which legally may not31 (and normatively should not32)
be regulated on account of its viewpoint. So, too, in the arena of quasi
campaign finance. If this activity is problematic, it is because of the
resources that are dedicated to it, not the ideas that are propagated by
those resources. The ideas, again, are political advocacy that any
democracy should cherish. Accordingly, my definition emphasizes the
funding of nonelectoral communications, as does my subsequent
analysis.33

29. The literature includes a few other definitional efforts, none of which are quite right, in
my view. See, e.g., KEN KOLLMAN, OUTSIDE LOBBYING: PUBLIC OPINION & INTEREST GROUP
STRATEGIES 3 (1998) (defining “outside lobbying” as “attempts by interest group leaders to
mobilize citizens outside the policymaking community to contact or pressure public officials
inside the policymaking community” (emphasis omitted)); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN, SIDNEY
VERBA & HENRY E. BRADY, THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND
THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 400 (2012) [hereinafter SCHLOZMAN ET AL.,
UNHEAVENLY CHORUS] (defining “grassroots lobbying” as “communicating with the public or
with organization members and supporters in order to highlight issues, to shape opinions, or to
generate communications to public officials in support of favored political positions”); Pam
Fielding, A Guide to Grassroots Advocacy for Lobbyists, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL 769, 770
(William V. Luneburg, Thomas M. Susman & Rebecca H. Gordon eds., 4th ed. 2009)
(“Grassroots lobbying is any formal or informal effort designed to influence policymakers or
policymaking by mobilizing the general public (or a segment of the general public) to support or
oppose a particular position on an issue.”).
30. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (per curiam) (analyzing “the giving and
spending of money” rather than the “forms of communication made possible by [it]”).
31. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
(“When the government targets . . . particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation
of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.”).
32. I share Alexander Meiklejohn’s view that “no idea, no opinion, no doubt, no belief, no
counterbelief, no relevant information, may be kept” from the people. ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 89 (1948).
33. See infra Parts II–III.
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These communications with voters may take the same forms as
electoral messages. They may thus include television and online
advertisements, fundraising solicitations, door-to-door canvassing,
phone banking, speeches, rallies, and protests. The only requirement is
that there be some provision of information from the payor of the quasi
campaign finance to the electorate. That the electorate is the audience
for the communications is important as well. My definition is only
intended to capture efforts at mass mobilization and persuasion. It is
not meant to extend to messages conveyed directly to elites, such as
politicians, bureaucrats, journalists, and scholars.34
This brings me to the first of the two distinguishing characteristics
of quasi campaign finance: the nonelectoral nature of the
communications with voters. They do not openly urge the election or
defeat of any candidate. Indeed, they often do not even mention any
candidate’s name. The messages may also be sent at any time, whether
an election is imminent or still years away. If anything, their schedule
is more closely tied to ongoing policy debates than to the electoral
calendar. Nevertheless, the communications are necessarily political.
Their subject may be an overarching ideology like libertarianism,
religious fundamentalism, environmentalism, or socialism. Or they
may tackle a particular issue like taxes, abortion, climate change, or
welfare. In either case, the messages provide the recipients with
information, argue for certain positions, and sometimes request that
the recipients take actions. These steps could be supplying contact
details, writing to representatives, giving money, or volunteering for
future activities.
The other essential attribute of quasi campaign finance is its
reliance on an electoral mechanism to be effective. This mechanism is
quite blunt for certain communications. Though their content is
nonelectoral, their primary purpose is to elect or defeat specific
candidates. The messages only take a nonelectoral form because their
funders have decided, for legal or strategic reasons, that this approach
is preferable to an overtly electoral effort. The mechanism is subtler,
however, for other communications. Their aim truly is policy change
(or preservation), not returning candidates to (or ousting them from)
office. The broadcasters of these messages may even be agnostic as to
who is elected as long as their policy priorities are achieved. Yet these
activities, too, depend on an electoral connection for their efficacy.
34. I want to emphasize the word “directly” in this definition. Quasi campaign finance
certainly intends to convey messages indirectly to elites through the activities of mobilized voters.
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Actually, they depend on several related links. Perhaps the most
obvious is the threat of future electoral mobilization. A group that is
able to reach many voters with nonelectoral communications could
likely do the same—only with electoral messages—during the next
campaign. The group could use exactly the same tactics but switch their
mode from nonelectoral to electoral advocacy. Knowing this, electionseeking politicians may be inclined to do what the group wants: to
support (or oppose) the group’s preferred (or disfavored) policies.
That way, the politicians may avoid a large-scale effort being launched
against them close to the next election—or benefit from a major
mobilization on their own behalf.35
Another pathway hinges not on a group’s future electoral
activities but rather on the cogency of its current nonelectoral
communications. Suppose that a group’s quasi campaign finance
convinces some voters to shift their positions on a given issue. These
may be ordinary voters whose only resources are their ballots; or they
may be more influential constituents thanks to their campaign
contributions, political connections, and activism. This change in public
opinion may induce politicians to adjust their own stances in the same
direction. Some politicians may adhere to a delegate theory of
representation, under which they ought to reflect faithfully their
voters’ views. Less high-mindedly, other politicians may worry that if
they are not responsive to their constituents’ preferences, they may
face an electoral penalty. Ordinary voters who find that candidates do
not share their positions may vote against them on election day. Even
worse, more influential constituents who are at odds with candidates
may offer their time, money, and networks to opposing politicians.36
A final route through which quasi campaign finance may have an
electoral impact is a variant of the previous one. Even if nonelectoral
messages do not persuade voters, they may raise the salience of certain

35. For other scholars noting this mechanism, see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 39 (“[I]f
[groups] can recruit citizens to write about an issue, they can recruit citizens to vote on an issue.”)
and Bergan, supra note 15, at 329 (“[T]his method can signal to legislators that groups are able to
mobilize supporters, and may be able to do so in the next election, giving the legislator an
incentive to support the groups’ preferred policies.”).
36. For other scholars noting this mechanism, see KOLLMAN, supra note 29, at 8 (explaining
that “outside lobbying” may “influence public opinion by changing how selected constituents
consider and respond to policy issues”) and ANTHONY J. NOWNES, TOTAL LOBBYING: WHAT
LOBBYISTS WANT (AND HOW THEY TRY TO GET IT) 79 (2006) (“The influence of constituent
opinion on the behavior of elected officials—especially legislators—cannot be overestimated.”).
Note that if quasi campaign finance exerts its influence because elected officials think of
themselves as delegates, that is a nonelectoral mechanism.

STEPHANOPOULOS IN PRINTER FINAL(DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

QUASI CAMPAIGN FINANCE

10/16/2020 12:50 PM

345

issues and educate voters as to how their representatives have
addressed those issues. This is a more modest role for quasi campaign
finance, requiring only that it not be ignored by its audience. Yet it
could create much the same incentive for politicians to endorse the
policies favored by the funders of the nonelectoral communications. If
they fail to do so, after all, they could risk electoral retribution from
voters newly attentive to a topic and newly aware of what candidates
are saying (or not saying) about it.37
B. Demarcation
So defined, quasi campaign finance is mostly exempt from (1)
conventional campaign finance regulation; (2) lobbying law; and (3)
the tax code. In the seminal case of Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme
Court held that the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”)—the
1974 law that established the modern framework of campaign finance
regulation—applies only to “communications that include explicit
words of advocacy of election or defeat of a candidate.” 38 Quasi
campaign finance is thus entirely uncovered by FECA since one of its
hallmarks is that it does not pay for messages that overtly urge a
candidate’s election or defeat. Consequently, under FECA, quasi
campaign finance is not limited in any way, nor does it have to be
disclosed to the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”).
The story is similar, if not quite identical, under the other key
federal campaign finance statute: the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002 (“BCRA”). BCRA created a new category of
“electioneering communication” that includes “any broadcast, cable,
or satellite communication” that “refers to a clearly identified
candidate” and is made within thirty days of a primary or sixty days of
a general election.39 Most quasi campaign finance is not electioneering

37. For other scholars noting this mechanism, see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 34
(observing that “[g]rass roots lobbying” may “make policy effects more salient,” “make
constituents aware of government actions,” and “link legislators to those policy effects and
government actions”) and Bergan, supra note 15, at 329 (“[G]rassroots lobbying campaigns
simultaneously inform group members of the actions that a legislator is taking on an issue (such
as legislative votes) and let legislators know that group members are informed and paying
attention to legislative actions.”).
38. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43 (1976) (per curiam). On its face, the statute extended to
communications “relative to a clearly identified candidate,” id. at 39 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 608(e)(1) (1790 ed., Supp. IV), but the Court adopted a narrowing construction in order to
“preserve the provision against invalidation on vagueness grounds,” id. at 44.
39. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3)(A) (2018). BCRA’s prohibition of corporation and union
electioneering communication was upheld in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 203–09 (2003), but
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communication. The messages it pays for typically are not television
ads, or do not mention a candidate, or are not disseminated close
enough to an election. A fraction of quasi campaign finance, however,
is regulated by BCRA. Take a television ad, aired near an election, that
mostly discusses a certain policy but closes by asking viewers to contact
a candidate about that issue. Even though the ad is nonelectoral
(otherwise it would not be quasi campaign finance), BCRA requires
the disclosure of its content and funding to the FEC.40
Beyond being subject to disclosure, the hypothetical ad is notable
in another respect: not only is it not express advocacy, it is not “sham”
issue advocacy either. Sham issue advocacy is a pejorative term for
communications that avoid the “magic words” of overt electoral
support or opposition—which would bring them within FECA’s
scope—but that are obviously aimed at influencing voters’ choices at
the polls. 41 The ad does not resort to this sort of subterfuge. By
assumption, it addresses a matter of policy, providing information to
its audience and endorsing a particular stance. It refers to a candidate
not to recommend her election or defeat, but rather to make clear
whom voters may contact to express their views on the topic. The ad is
thus true rather than sham issue advocacy: a genuinely policy-focused
and nonelectoral communication. This is the case, moreover, for all
quasi campaign finance. Indeed, the activity could equivalently be
labeled as that portion of true issue advocacy that relies on an electoral
mechanism to be effective.42
invalidated in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318–19, 366 (2010). However, Citizens United
upheld BCRA’s disclosure requirement for electioneering communication. See Citizens United,
558 U.S. at 366–71.
40. See § 30104(f) (specifying BCRA’s disclosure requirements for electioneering
communication).
41. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 185 (discussing the “proliferation of sham issue ads” in
the late 1990s); see also Richard L. Hasen, Measuring Overbreadth: Using Empirical Evidence To
Determine the Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Laws Targeting Sham Issue Advocacy, 85
MINN. L. REV. 1773, 1795 (2001) (finding in an empirical study that the “vast majority” of
electioneering communication that is not express advocacy is sham issue advocacy). A classic
example of this sham issue advocacy was a commercial detailing domestic violence perpetrated
by a candidate, his felony conviction, and his failure to pay child support, and concluding, “Call
Bill Yellowtail. Tell him to support family values.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 193 n.78.
42. As noted above, the primary subjective motivation of some quasi campaign finance may
be electoral. See supra Part I.A. To qualify as quasi campaign finance (rather than as sham issue
advocacy), however, its content must be nonelectoral. This obviously raises the question of how
to distinguish between electoral and nonelectoral material. I do not provide an answer here (at
least not beyond those supplied by FECA and BCRA) for two reasons. First, as discussed below,
the heartland of quasi campaign finance is plainly nonelectoral and thus avoids this quandary. See
infra Part I.C. Second, the distinction between electoral and nonelectoral content seems less
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Another body of law that might be thought applicable to quasi
campaign finance—but, in fact, is not—is lobbying regulation. The
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (“LDA”) requires the quarterly
reporting of “lobbying contacts,” which are “oral or written
communication[s]” with executive or legislative branch officials about
policy matters.43 Since some quasi campaign finance encourages voters
to make such communications, the resulting grassroots contacts may
seem like they would be covered by the LDA. However, the statute
exempts messages that are broadcast through a “medium of mass
communication,” which is precisely how quasi campaign finance often
reaches the electorate. 44 More importantly, the LDA’s legislative
history makes clear that it does not mandate the disclosure of so-called
“grassroots lobbying”: contacts between ordinary voters and elected
officials. As the law’s sponsor stated on the Senate floor, “We struck
any reference to grassroots lobbying from the lobbying reform bill . . .
in order to make progress.”45
Though it need not be reported under the LDA, grassroots
lobbying has an interesting relationship with quasi campaign finance.
A common goal of quasi campaign finance is to stimulate grassroots
lobbying: to convince voters to contact their representatives about the
issues that are the subject of the funders’ communications. This
lobbying may be effective simply because some politicians are
responsive to their constituents, irrespective of any electoral

important to me than the boundary between quasi campaign finance and public discourse. If the
claim is correct that quasi campaign finance may be conflated for legal purposes with conventional
campaign finance, then the line between them is largely immaterial. Communications may still be
regulated no matter on which side of the line they fall. In contrast, the border between quasi
campaign finance and public discourse then becomes a cliff. That becomes the frontier beyond
which regulation is almost categorically impermissible. See infra Part II.
43. Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1602(8)(A) (2018). More specifically,
lobbying contacts must be with certain “covered” officials and must pertain to federal legislation,
federal regulation, the administration of a federal program, or the nomination of a federal official.
See id. Registered lobbyists must file quarterly reports stating the clients and issues they lobbied
for, as well as the income they received for these activities. See id. § 1604(b).
44. Id. § 1602(8)(B)(iii). Even without this exemption, communications paid for by quasi
campaign finance would not have to be disclosed (even if they encourage grassroots contacts)
because they are directed at voters, not officials covered by the LDA. Id. § 1602(3)–(4).
45. 141 CONG. REC. 29,015 (1995) (statement of Sen. Levin); see also, e.g., Anita S.
Krishnakumar, Towards a Madisonian, Interest-Group-Based, Approach to Lobbying Regulation,
58 ALA. L. REV. 513, 529–30, 529 n.75 (2007) (“Because of the vociferous opposition to such
regulation, the final version of the LDA passed in 1995 contains no regulation of grassroots
lobbying.”). However, “most state lobbying disclosure laws do cover some grassroots lobbying
activity.” Richard Briffault, The Anxiety of Influence: The Evolving Regulation of Lobbying, 13
ELECTION L.J. 160, 187 (2014) [hereinafter Briffault, Anxiety] (emphasis added).
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implications. Or the grassroots contacts may have an impact because
other politicians realize that voters motivated enough to reach out to
them about policy matters may easily organize for or against them
during the next campaign. In the latter case, grassroots lobbying has an
electoral valence, and indeed constitutes one of the electoral
mechanisms through which quasi campaign finance achieves its aims.46
Tax law is the final field that is potentially relevant to quasi
campaign finance. A good deal of the activity is conducted by nonprofit
groups that are registered under § 501(c) of the Internal Revenue
Code: social welfare organizations (501(c)(4)s), labor unions
(501(c)(5)s), and business leagues (501(c)(6)s). 47 All of these groups
must file tax returns that are public and that detail their revenue,
expenses, and assets. 48 The tax returns also include questions about
“direct and indirect political campaign activities,” “lobbying
expenditures to influence public opinion (grassroots lobbying),” and
“lobbying expenditures to influence a legislative body (direct
lobbying).”49
But the tax returns do not ultimately provide the disclosure that
conventional campaign finance law and lobbying law fail to require.
The expenses that groups list are broken down by function:
“compensation,” “occupancy,” “travel,” and the like. 50 There is no
separate category for nonelectoral, yet still political, messages to
voters. In addition, the tax returns’ reference to “direct and indirect
political campaign activities” captures only electoral efforts—
conventional rather than quasi campaign finance.51 And the questions
about “grassroots lobbying” and “direct lobbying” 52 have to be
answered only by 501(c)(3) organizations that engage in lobbying. 53

46. Grassroots lobbying may also play a part in the other electoral mechanisms discussed
above. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. That is, it may suggest to politicians that
voters’ preferences have changed, that the salience of certain issues has increased, or that
politicians’ own positions are better known to the electorate.
47. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2018).
48. See I.R.S. Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (OMB No. 15450047) (2019) [hereinafter Form 990], https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf [https://perma.cc/
EUP6-G8D8].
49. Form 990 Schedule C, supra note 7, at pt. I-A, II-A.
50. Form 990, supra note 48, at pt. IX.
51. Form 990 Schedule C, supra note 7, at pt. I-A.
52. Id. at pt. II-A.
53. See Form 990, supra note 48, at pt. IV (“Section 501(c)(3) organizations. Did the
organization engage in lobbying activities . . . ? If ‘Yes,’ complete Schedule C, Part II.” (first
emphasis omitted)).
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Other nonprofit groups may ignore these questions. In fact, as long as
they do not receive membership dues, other groups need not supply
any information at all about their nonelectoral activities—lobbying or
otherwise.54
C. Examples
Quasi campaign finance, then, is money that pays for
communications with voters that are not about elections but that
nevertheless depend on an electoral link for their effectiveness. Quasi
campaign finance is also mostly unregulated by the bodies of law that
apply to ordinary campaign finance, lobbying, and taxation. But
moving beyond these initial points, what does quasi campaign finance
actually look like? On the ground, which actors use which tactics to
address which issues?
I cannot provide a full answer here, due to both space constraints
and the lack of disclosure of most nonelectoral, yet still political,
activities. I can, however, offer a number of examples of quasi
campaign finance, gleaned from the work of many journalists and a few
enterprising political scientists. These examples, of course, are not
necessarily representative. They may be, but it is impossible to say for
sure since the relevant universe is shrouded in uncertainty. Still, the
examples suggest that quasi campaign finance is often paid for by
wealthy individuals who are involved in electoral as well as
nonelectoral politics; that its techniques closely resemble those of
electoral campaigns; and that its topics tend to be controversial areas
of ongoing public debate.
I began this Article with a synopsis of the nonelectoral efforts of
Americans for Prosperity: canvassing voters to spread a libertarian
message, organizing rallies to oppose the Obama administration’s capand-trade proposal, running ads against politicians considering

54. See id. (“Is the organization a section 501(c)(4), 501(c)(5), or 501(c)(6) organization that
receives membership dues . . . ? If ‘Yes,’ complete Schedule C, Part III.”). In its most recent
publicly available tax return, for example, AFP reported total expenses of $51.7 million as well as
$2.9 million of electoral spending. Ams. for Prosperity Found., Form 990, Return of Organization
Exempt from Income Tax 1 (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2017), https://projects.propublica.org/
nonprofits/display_990/521527294/02_2019_prefixes_47-52%2F521527294_201712_990_2019022716130818
[https://perma.cc/8HJ8-ZJL9]; Ams. for Prosperity Found., Form 990 Schedule C, Political Campaign
and Lobbying Activities 1 (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2017), https://projects.propublica.org/Nonprofits/
display_990/521527294/02_2019_prefixes_47-52%2F521527294_201712_990_2019022716130818
[https://perma.cc/8HJ8-ZJL9]. But because AFP is a nonmembership 501(c)(4) organization, it
did not say a word about its lobbying or other nonelectoral activities.
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Medicaid expansion, and so on. 55 I chose AFP as an introductory
example because it appears to be the single biggest spender on quasi
campaign finance in contemporary American politics. Surveying AFP
tax returns and archived AFP web pages, political scientists Theda
Skocpol and Alexander Hertel-Fernandez found that the group’s
annual budget increased from $4 million in 2005 to $150 million in 2015,
its staff rose from nineteen to five hundred full-time employees, and its
volunteer activists grew from two hundred thousand to 2.4 million.56
AFP’s funds are supplied by the Koch brothers and their affiliated
network of conservative donors.57 They are deployed for not only quasi
campaign finance but also regular campaign finance and lobbying. 58
And in their sheer scale, they make AFP “a privatized political and
policy advocacy operation like no other in American history,” with
capabilities that rival those of the Republican Party itself.59
AFP uses these vast resources to advance a range of policies
beyond the ones noted at the Article’s outset.60 At the federal level, for
instance, AFP launched a “Porkulus” effort against the Obama
administration’s stimulus package,61 fought the passage and then the
implementation of Obamacare, 62 initiated the “Spending

55. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text.
56. See Skocpol & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 21, at 687; see also, e.g., Henry Farrell,
Alexander Hertel-Fernandez & Theda Skocpol, Trump Will Win or Lose. Either Way, the Koch
Network Will Still Shape the Republican Party, WASH. POST (Feb. 29, 2016, 8:45 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/29/trump-may-win-or-lose-eitherway-the-koch-network-will-still-shape-the-republican-party [https://perma.cc/LL5B-9YY3] (reporting
that “Koch donors gave close to $400 million leading into 2012 and [had] pledged to spend
between $700 and $900 million for the 2015–16 cycle”).
57. See, e.g., Kenneth P. Vogel, Inside the Vast Liberal Conspiracy, POLITICO (June 23, 2014,
5:01 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2014/06/inside-the-vast-liberal-conspiracy-108171 [https://
perma.cc/S4SM-N5FD] (“Koch network donors are expected to provide almost every penny of
the Koch operation’s . . . spending goal[s].”).
58. See, e.g., Farrell, Hertel-Fernandez & Skocpol, supra note 56 (“[AFP] mov[es] seamlessly
from helping to elect very conservative Republicans to lobbying them once in office to effectuate
preferred policies.”).
59. Kenneth P. Vogel, How the Koch Network Rivals the GOP, POLITICO (Dec. 30, 2015,
5:17 AM) [hereinafter Vogel, Koch Network], https://www.politico.com/story/2015/12/kochbrothers-network-gop-david-charles-217124 [https://perma.cc/E4CG-V2S5]; see also, e.g.,
Skocpol & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 21, at 689 (commenting that AFP “more closely
resembles a European-style political party than any sort of specialized traditional U.S. advocacy
group or election campaign organization”).
60. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 2, at 209.
62. See, e.g., id. at 237.
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Accountability Project” in support of automatic spending reductions,63
and backed the Trump administration’s tax cuts. 64 In the states,
similarly, AFP “focus[es] relentlessly on promoting tax cuts, blocking
and eliminating business regulations, opposing the landmark healthreform law passed in 2010, pushing for reductions in funding of (and,
where possible, the privatization of) public education and socialwelfare programs, and opposing state-level environmental
initiatives.” 65 AFP pursues these aims through the same means as
campaigns for elected office. It holds rallies, including more than three
hundred against Obamacare. 66 It broadcasts ads, like its attacks on
politicians contemplating Medicaid expansion.67 And its hundreds of
employees and thousands of volunteers represent “a permanent
ground force” that never stops calling and canvassing voters, even
outside the electoral season.68 As one of AFP’s regional directors told
his staff, “If you think you’re having fun now, just wait until after the
election, because then you’ll start to see the fear in these legislators’
eyes—‘Oh wait, AFP’s not leaving?’”69
While AFP is the Koch brothers’ flagship organization, it is only a
part of a broader constellation of Koch-backed groups that engage in
significant nonelectoral activities. Unlike the generalist AFP, these
other groups target specific constituencies with the Kochs’ smallgovernment ideology. Generation Opportunity appeals to collegeaged voters, the LIBRE Initiative is directed at Latinos, the 60 Plus
Association reaches out to senior citizens, and so on.70 Despite their

63. See, e.g., T.W. Farnam, Americans for Prosperity Campaigns To Let the Sequester Take
Effect in March, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2013) https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
americans-for-prosperity-campaigns-to-let-the-sequester-take-effect-in-march/2013/02/14/
fa339670-76cf-11e2-95e4-6148e45d7adb_story.html [https://perma.cc/LFD7-LY56].
64. See, e.g., Jeremy W. Peters, Conservative Groups Seeking Support for Tax Cuts Find it a
Hard Sell, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2AXyiOO [https://perma.cc/GA6C-U8QC].
65. Skocpol & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 21, at 690; see also, e.g., Farrell, HertelFernandez & Skocpol, supra note 56 (describing AFP efforts “to block Medicaid expansion in the
states, weaken public sector labor unions, stop environmental and climate change reforms, and
limit government spending”).
66. See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 2, at 237.
67. See, e.g., Hertel-Fernandez, Skocpol & Lynch, supra note 4, at 274.
68. Gold, supra note 1.
69. Id.; see also, e.g., Skocpol & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 21, at 689 (“In another
distinctive combination, Americans for Prosperity conducts political activities between as well as
during elections, maintaining a continuity of effort that its leaders proudly tout . . . .”).
70. See, e.g., Vogel, Koch Network, supra note 59. Other Koch-backed groups targeting
specific constituencies include the Concerned Women for America and the Concerned Veterans
for America. Id. After years of separate existence, these groups were recently relocated within
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narrower audiences, these groups push the same policies, and rely on
the same tactics as AFP. Generation Opportunity thus runs ads against
Obamacare (featuring a “creepy Uncle Sam”) and throws tailgate
parties where attendees are urged not to purchase health insurance.71
The LIBRE Initiative provides services like English-language classes,
resume-writing assistance, and free Thanksgiving turkeys; in return,
beneficiaries have to provide their contact information and listen to
LIBRE’s libertarian pitch.72 And the 60 Plus Association promotes the
privatization of Social Security through bus tours, rallies, and
commercials, especially in senior-rich Florida.73
Of course, quasi campaign finance is not the exclusive province of
the Koch network. On the left, hedge fund billionaire Tom Steyer has
founded a pair of organizations, NextGen America and Need to
Impeach, that are dedicated to combating climate change and
impeaching President Trump, respectively. 74 Between them, these
groups have close to a thousand employees and biannual outlays of
over $100 million (though most of these resources seem to be allocated
to electoral activities).75 The groups’ nonelectoral efforts include town
halls, petition drives, door-to-door canvassing, and ad campaigns about
AFP itself. See James Hohmann, The Daily 202: The Koch Network Is Reorganizing Under a New
Name and with New Priorities, WASH. POST (May 20, 2019, 10:19 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/daily-202/2019/05/20/daily-202-the-koch-networkis-reorganizing-under-a-new-name-and-with-new-priorities/5ce1a94fa7a0a435cff8c0d3 [https://
perma.cc/WC6H-2PU7].
71. See, e.g., Ashley Alman, Creepy Uncle Sam Parties with College Students To Slam
Obamacare, HUFFPOST (Nov. 12, 2013, 11:19 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/creepy-unclesam-obamacare_n_4260116 [https://perma.cc/MAN5-2EB4]; Garance Franke-Ruta, Creepy AntiObamacare Ads Suggest Where Uncle Sam Wants To Stick It, ATLANTIC (Sept. 19, 2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/09/creepy-anti-obamacare-ads-suggest-whereuncle-sam-wants-to-stick-it/279825 [https://perma.cc/UG2P-ECRU].
72. See, e.g., Ed O’Keefe, As Influx of Puerto Ricans Continues, Koch-Based Group Starts
Seeking Them Out in Florida, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/powerpost/wp/2018/01/08/as-influx-of-puerto-ricans-continues-koch-backed-group-startsseeking-them-out-in-florida [https://perma.cc/4VTR-XXJK]; Ashley Parker, Koch Brothers Woo
Hispanic Voters with Turkeys and Questionnaires, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2015),
https://nyti.ms/1Yv8koC [https://perma.cc/8M8V-XNLQ].
73. See, e.g., Jeremy Wallace, AARP Rivals Launch Bus Tour in Sarasota, SARASOTA
HERALD TRIB. (June 20, 2012), http://politics.heraldtribune.com/2012/06/20/aarp-rivals-launchbus-tour-in-sarasota [https://perma.cc/Y3ZJ-NAFC]; Medicare Tall Tales, TAMPA BAY TIMES
(Dec. 7, 2009), https://www.tampabay.com/archive/2009/12/07/medicare-tall-tales [https://
perma.cc/DtE2-X2DS].
74. See, e.g., Edward-Isaac Dovere, Tom Steyer’s $110 Million Plan To Redefine the
Democrats, POLITICO (July 31, 2018, 5:05 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/31/steyerdemocrats-millions-midterms-751245 [https://perma.cc/6B89-4HEF].
75. Id.
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the environment and impeachment. 76 Likewise, media billionaire
Michael Bloomberg has launched two organizations, Partnership for a
New American Economy and Mayors Against Illegal Guns, that aim,
in turn, to enact immigration reform and to restrict access to guns.77
Both groups have unleashed ad blitzes at times when congressional
action looked feasible and built grassroots networks to reach voters
and encourage them to contact their representatives.78
Beyond wealthy individuals, labor unions have long been major
spenders on quasi campaign finance on behalf of liberal causes. In
recent years, the Service Employees International Union (“SEIU”)
has set aside as much as $10 million for calling members of Congress,
after elections are over, and pressing them on health care and other
issues. 79 The SEIU has also staged protests and conducted door-todoor canvassing to fight anti-union proposals in several states.80 The
AFL-CIO has begun a program called “Working America” as well,
with canvassing offices across the country and an emphasis on “yearround mobilization and education.” 81 In earlier periods, labor’s
nonelectoral activities were even more widespread, creating an
“‘anchoring’ relationship” between it and the Democratic Party that
“pull[ed] the [Democrats] to the left on economic issues.” 82 The
76. See, e.g., Monica Hesse, Want To Impeach the President?, WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 2018,
6:30 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/want-to-impeach-the-president-thisbillionaire-is-on-the-case/2018/03/26/da7d0fdc-2d13-11e8-8688-e053ba58f1e4_story.html [https://
perma.cc/GBU8-XN3J]; Alicia Mundy, Billionaire’s Climate Group Targets Seven Elections,
WALL ST. J. (May 22, 2014, 1:20 AM), http://on.wsj.com/1krc3kB [https://perma.cc/DBC7YN8Y].
77. See, e.g., Michael Barbaro, Bloomberg’s TV Blitz on Guns Puts Swing Senators on the
Spot, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2013), https://nyti.ms/Y6FSMY [https://perma.cc/A5NG-T6M9];
Anna Palmer, Maggie Haberman & John Bresnahan, Bloomberg’s D.C. Footprint Explodes,
POLITICO (Jan. 29, 2013, 2:06 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/bloombergwashington-footprint-086874 [https://perma.cc/4T3Q-8MJ7]; Anna Palmer, Immigration Groups
To Target GOP, POLITICO (July 31, 2013, 5:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/
2013/07/immigration-groups-target-house-gop-094949 [https://perma.cc/L895-KDEU]
78. See Barbaro, supra note 77; Palmer, Haberman & Bresnahan, supra note 77; Palmer,
supra note 77.
79. Kris Maher, SEIU Plans to Spend Big on Its Agenda, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 8, 2009, 12:01
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123137926891763113?st=jeabkop6l3etjth [https://perma.cc/
46KK-HFVE].
80. See, e.g., Ben Smith, New Labor Plan: Nationwide Protests, POLITICO (Apr. 21, 2011,
2:31 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2011/04/new-labor-plan-nationwide-protests-053547
[https://perma.cc/56CL-T6EA].
81. Amy Dean, Is “Working America” the Way Forward?, 21 NEW LAB. F. 60, 63 (2012).
82. Skocpol & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 21, at 690; see generally DANIEL SCHLOZMAN,
WHEN MOVEMENTS ANCHOR PARTIES (2015) (discussing the anchoring function of unions for
the Democratic Party).
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Supreme Court acknowledged labor’s voluminous investment in
midcentury quasi campaign finance in the 1957 case of United States v.
UAW. 83 One union, the Court noted, had “an annual budget for
‘educational’ work approximating $1,500,000” and “supplie[d] over
500 radio stations with ‘briefs for broadcasters.’” 84 Another union,
“with an annual budget of over $300,000 for political ‘education,’ ha[d]
distributed some 80,000,000 pieces of literature.”85
The Court discussed business-backed quasi campaign finance, too,
in the 1961 case of Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc.86 Trucking and railroad companies in Pennsylvania
each sought the enactment of legislation that would benefit their sector
and undercut the competition.87 The truckers thus “wrote to and made
personal contacts with legislators in support of bills increasing the
weight of trucks,” and encouraged other parties to “make personal
contacts with legislators in Harrisburg without disclosing trucker
connections.”88 Not to be outdone, the railroads “utilized the so-called
third-party technique,” by which “the publicity matter circulated in the
campaign was made to appear as spontaneously expressed views of
independent persons and civic groups when, in fact, it was largely
prepared and . . . paid for by the railroads.”89 In sum, the truckers and
the railroads each “utilized all the political powers [they] could muster
in an attempt to bring about the passage of laws that would help [one
sector] or injure the other.”90

83. United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 579–80 (1957).
84. Id. at 580–81.
85. Id. at 581. On the merits, the Court held that union spending on conventional campaign
finance—specifically, “television broadcasts designed to influence the electorate to select certain
candidates for Congress”—violated federal law. Id. at 585.
86. E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
87. Id. at 127, 132.
88. Id. at 141 n.22 (quoting Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. E. R.R. Presidents Conf., 155 F.
Supp. 768, 803 (E.D. Pa. 1957)).
89. Id. at 129–30.
90. Id. at 145. On the merits, the Court held that none of these activities violated the
Sherman Act. See id. at 135–45. Antitrust law thus also does not reach quasi campaign finance.
For other examples of historical quasi campaign finance, see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 22–
23, discussing the efforts of the Anti-Saloon League to enact Prohibition and of the American
Cotton Manufacturers Institute to levy protectionist tariffs; and see generally ISAAC WILLIAM
MARTIN, RICH PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS: GRASSROOTS CAMPAIGNS TO UNTAX THE ONE
PERCENT (2013), surveying mass movements aimed at cutting taxes for the wealthy.
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D. Volume
There are many examples of quasi campaign finance, then,
spanning many funders and many years. In fact, it is probably fair to
say that American politics is unthinkable without quasi campaign
finance—without, that is, efforts to communicate with voters about
nonelectoral matters while still depending on electoral connections.
But the above examples are just that: a series of anecdotes that cannot
reveal the overall landscape of quasi campaign finance. What is the
shape of this terrain when it is surveyed systematically rather than
piecemeal? How much money is spent on quasi campaign finance, and
by whom? What causes this spending to rise or fall? What effects does
the spending have on voters, on politicians, and on American
democracy as a whole?
The unfortunate truth is that it is hard to say. Because neither
conventional campaign finance law, nor lobbying law, nor tax law
requires the disclosure of quasi campaign finance, no comprehensive
record exists of its sources, amounts, or uses. In this Section and the
two that follow, I must therefore rely on a series of inadequate studies
to describe the contours of quasi campaign finance. These studies are
better than nothing; they give us a glimpse, at least, of the true role of
nonelectoral, yet still political, activities. But the studies are also
limited in many ways, which I flag as I go through them in order to be
candid about how little is currently known.91
To start, there are four kinds of potential spenders on quasi
campaign finance: individuals, for-profit entities, nonprofit entities,
and political entities. There is simply no information about the relevant
efforts of individuals, for-profit entities, or political entities. These
efforts do not have to be disclosed, nor has any academic work
attempted to estimate them. However, there is reason to think they
might all be minor in scope. Individuals and for-profit entities spend
quite little (directly) 92 on ordinary campaign finance, via express

91. As a pair of scholars remarked about the challenge of assessing grassroots lobbying,
understanding quasi campaign finance is also like “a blind man searching for a black cat in a coal
bin at midnight.” Linda L. Fowler & Ronald G. Shaiko, The Grass Roots Connection:
Environmental Activists and Senate Roll Calls, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 484, 487 (1987) (quoting Burdett
A. Loomis, A New Era: Groups and the Grass Root, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 184 (Allan J.
Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis eds., 1983)); see also, e.g., SCHLOZMAN ET AL., UNHEAVENLY
CHORUS, supra note 29, at 401 (“[T]here is no obvious source of systematic information . . . about
grassroots lobbying efforts . . . .”).
92. Indirectly, individuals and for-profit entities provide the bulk of political entities’
resources, which are then spent primarily on ordinary campaign finance. See, e.g., Top Individuals
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advocacy or electioneering communication.93 It is thus unlikely, though
not impossible, that they would devote significant resources to quasi
campaign finance. If they did conduct extensive nonelectoral activities,
after all, why would they not complement them with electoral
advocacy? 94 Analogously, political entities such as political action
committees (“PACs”), super PACs, and § 527 organizations are
structured as such because they mostly urge the election or defeat of
particular candidates.95 It would be outside these groups’ missions to
communicate frequently with voters about nonelectoral issues.
This leaves nonprofit entities, which notably include almost every
organization discussed thus far. 96 AFP and the other Koch-funded
groups are 501(c)(4)s, as are Steyer’s NextGen Climate Action and
Bloomberg’s Partnership for a New American Economy Action

Funding Outside Spending Groups, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL. (Feb. 1, 2019), https://
www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2018 &disp=D&type=V&superonly=N
[https://perma.cc/3XUJ-2V5U] (listing the largest individual donors to outside spending groups
in 2018); Top Organizations Funding Outside Spending Groups, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL.
(Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2018&disp=
D&type=O&superonly=N [https://perma.cc/7VG5-A4NM] (same for organizations).
93. In 2018, for example, the most an individual spent directly on federal elections was
$271,864 (by Bill Bloomfield) and the most a corporation spent directly was $53,546 (by Patagonia
Inc.). See 2018 Outside Spending, by Group, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL. (Mar. 26, 2019),
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2018&chrt=V&disp=O&type=A
[https://perma.cc/H747-4DHF]; see also, e.g., Adam Bonica, Avenues of Influence: On the Political
Expenditures of Corporations and Their Directors and Executives, 18 BUS. POL. 367, 367 (2016)
(finding that, after Citizens United, “[t]he anticipated flood of corporate political cash has
amounted to no more than a trickle”). By comparison, ninety-nine other entities spent more than
$1 million. 2018 Outside Spending, by Group, supra.
94. There could be sensible answers such as maintaining anonymity and obtaining tax
advantages. However, electoral advocacy can also be conducted anonymously (through donations
to dark money groups) and donations to 501(c)(4)s are not tax-deductible.
95. For a helpful discussion of the different kinds of political entities, see Types of Advocacy
Groups, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/527s/types.php [https://
perma.cc/73AU-JDSN].
96. More specifically, it leaves 501(c)(4)s, 501(c)(5)s, and 501(c)(6)s. “[N]o substantial part
of the activities” of 501(c)(3) charities may be “carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting,
to influence legislation.” 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018). Even among 501(c)(4)s, “advocacy,
whether lobbying or campaign intervention . . . takes place in less than one-third of . . .
organizations and generates less than one-seventh of the subsector’s revenue.” Ellen P. Aprill,
Examining the Landscape of § 501(c)(4) Social Welfare Organizations, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 345, 364 (2018).
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Fund. 97 The SEIU and the AFL-CIO are both 501(c)(5)s. 98 Drew
Dimmery and Andrew Peterson recently published the best available
(though still far from satisfactory) analysis of the political activities of
nonprofit entities. Dimmery and Peterson first used a machinelearning algorithm to scour the websites of hundreds of thousands of
nonprofit groups and categorize them as political or nonpolitical.99 The
authors then obtained from the Internal Revenue Service the political
groups’ tax returns, which contain their annual budgets.100 Lastly, the
authors multiplied the total annual spending of the political groups by
an estimate of the share of the groups’ budgets that is devoted to
political activities. 101 This method yielded a total of $760 million in
nonprofit political spending in 2011.102
This figure must be taken with a large grain of salt, at least as an
approximation of the volume of quasi campaign finance. First, it covers
all political activities carried out by political nonprofit groups. But
these activities include not just quasi campaign finance but also regular
campaign finance (which non-501(c)(3)s may fund as long as it is not
their primary function103) and direct lobbying (which non-501(c)(3)s
may undertake without limit104). Second, the figure does not take into

97. See Ams. for Prosperity Found., Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income
Tax (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2017), https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/
753148958/201803189349307405/full [https://perma.cc/STK6-D8BF]; Nextgen Climate Action,
Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2016),
https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/461957345/201733199349313158/full [https://
perma.cc/2GV6-5MNJ]; P’ship for a New Am. Econ. Action Fund, Form 990, Return of Organization
Exempt from Income Tax (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2017), https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/
display_990/273604435/03_2019_prefixes_27-31%2F273604435_201712_990O_2019030716156901
[https://perma.cc/H2AY-EYKJ].
98. See AFL-CIO Laws. Coordinating Comm., Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt
from Income Tax (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2017), https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/
organizations/521304063/201830959349300148/full [https://perma.cc/GU82-HXZW]; Serv. Emp.
Int’l Union, Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (OMB No. 1545-0047)
(2017), https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/display_990/930323147/06_2020_prefixes_8795%2F930323147_201709_990O_2020061117187336 [https://perma.cc/949B-LWHT].
99. See Dimmery & Peterson, Shining the Light, supra note 10, at 54–61. The algorithm was
trained using groups known to be political (such as PACs). See id. at 55.
100. See id. at 62.
101. See id. at 62–64.
102. See id. at 65.
103. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (2020) (permitting “participation or intervention
in political campaigns” as long as groups are not “operated primarily” for this purpose).
104. Compare id. § 1.501(c)(4)-1 (imposing no lobbying restrictions on 501(c)(4)s), with id.
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(3)(i) (permitting 501(c)(3)s to “devote [no] more than an insubstantial part of
[their] activities” to lobbying).
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account quasi campaign finance paid for by entities that are not
nonprofit groups. These entities may not be the most lavish spenders
in this area, 105 but their efforts still cannot be ignored. And third,
Dimmery and Peterson “simply use a figure of 1 percent” as their
estimate of the share of political nonprofit groups’ budgets that is
devoted to political activities.106 This is nothing more than an educated
guess, which is why the authors “invite readers to adjust [the]
estimate[] according to their prior beliefs.”107
Despite these problems, $760 million is probably in the ballpark
of what is spent annually on quasi campaign finance. Several other data
points also suggest a sum on the order of $1 billion, or maybe somewhat
more. 108 For instance, Edward Walker has surveyed grassroots
lobbying firms and concluded that they amount to a roughly $1 billion
industry. 109 As noted earlier, there is considerable overlap between
grassroots lobbying and quasi campaign finance, one of whose aims is
often motivating contacts between voters and their representatives.110
Similarly, 501(c)(4)s that engage in “civil rights, social action, and
advocacy” have a total annual revenue of around $2 billion.111 These
groups include many of the most familiar and prolific spenders on quasi
campaign finance. And according to the Wesleyan Media Project, close
to $400 million was disbursed on issue advertising that did not overtly
support or oppose candidates in the 2016 election cycle. 112 Such
105. See supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text.
106. Dimmery & Peterson, Shining the Light, supra note 10, at 64.
107. Id.
108. Dimmery and Peterson agree that their $760 million figure is “a conservative estimate of
the actual political expenditure of nonprofits.” Id.
109. See Edward T. Walker, Opinion, Grass-Roots Mobilization, by Corporate America, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 10, 2012), https://nyti.ms/O9zvBX [https://perma.cc/QM2Z-PUH5]; see also, e.g.,
EDWARD T. WALKER, GRASSROOTS FOR HIRE: PUBLIC AFFAIRS CONSULTANTS IN AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 68 (2014) (noting an earlier estimate that grassroots lobbying was an $800 million
industry in the 1990s).
110. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
111. See JEREMY KOULISH, FROM CAMPS TO CAMPAIGN FUNDS: THE HISTORY, ANATOMY,
AND ACTIVITIES OF 501(C)(4) ORGANIZATIONS 16 (2016). Of course, it is unclear what
proportion of this $2 billion is spent on quasi campaign finance rather than on other political
activities.
112. This data is on file with the author and was obtained from the Wesleyan Media Project.
Data Access, WESLEYAN MEDIA PROJECT, http://mediaproject.wesleyan.edu/dataaccess
[https://perma.cc/58DP-JV2J]. The Wesleyan Media Project only tracks commercials that refer to
at least one candidate, so spending on issue ads that do not mention a candidate is unknown. The
$400 million figure also includes only congressional and gubernatorial elections; it omits
presidential and down-ballot races. See also, e.g., JOSEPH E. CANTOR, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 9791GOV, SOFT AND HARD MONEY IN CONTEMPORARY ELECTIONS: WHAT FEDERAL LAW

STEPHANOPOULOS IN PRINTER FINAL(DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

QUASI CAMPAIGN FINANCE

10/16/2020 12:50 PM

359

advertising about nonelectoral politics is a classic tool of quasi
campaign finance.
The Wesleyan Media Project’s advertising dataset also hints that
the volume of quasi campaign finance may be rising. Only $250 million
was spent on issue advertising that refrained from using magic words
in the 2012 election cycle—more than 30 percent less than in the 2016
cycle. 113 Likewise, Professor John Cluverius has shown that “[t]he
rate[] of citizen contact to politicians has increased as much as tenfold
in the last decade.”114 This surge may be attributable to both greater
funding of nonelectoral communications with voters and the
emergence of more convenient digital means of reaching out to elected
officials.115 And Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez’s survey of the Koch
network indicates that its groups’ budgets have exploded. Kochbacked entities that pay for quasi campaign finance had combined
budgets of just $6 million in 2001–2002, compared to $433 million in
2013–2014.116
If the scale of quasi campaign finance is, in fact, about $1 billion
per year, then it belongs in the same conversation as conventional
campaign finance and direct lobbying. Ordinary campaign spending
has averaged approximately $3 billion per year over the last few
election cycles.117 Direct (non-grassroots) lobbying expenditures have
also hovered near $3 billion annually in recent years.118 Yet both of
these activities are the subjects of entire cottage industries of scholarly
DOES AND DOES NOT REGULATE 5 (Mar. 15, 2002) (citing an estimate of $509 million spent on
broadcast issue advocacy in 2000); Richard L. Hall & Molly E. Reynolds, Targeted Issue
Advertising and Legislative Strategy: The Inside Ends of Outside Lobbying, 74 J. POL. 888, 888
(2012) (noting that spending on issue advertising in the Washington, D.C. media market totaled
$400 million in the 108th Congress).
113. Again, this data is on file with the author.
114. John Cluverius, How the Flattened Costs of Grassroots Lobbying Affect Legislator
Responsiveness, 70 POL. RSCH. Q. 279, 281 (2017).
115. See id. at 280–81; see also, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 24 (noting “[g]rowth in the
use of grass roots tactics by corporations and trade associations”); Anthony J. Nownes & Patricia
Freeman, Interest Group Activity in the States, 60 J. POL. 86, 93 (1998) (finding that “in the 1990s
grass-roots techniques [were] more common everywhere than they were in the early 1980s”).
116. See Skocpol & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 21, at app. A. All calculations are by the
author. The budgets of the Koch-backed groups, of course, pay for activities beyond quasi
campaign finance.
117. See Cost of Election, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/
overview/cost.php [https://perma.cc/PCX7-L654] (showing total costs of $5.7 billion for the twoyear 2018 federal election cycle and $6.5 billion for the 2016 cycle).
118. See Lobbying Data Summary, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL. (July 23, 2020), https://
www.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying [https://perma.cc/6ATJ-J6DW] (showing total direct
federal lobbying of almost $3.5 billion in 2018 and close to $3.4 billion in 2017).

STEPHANOPOULOS IN PRINTER FINAL(DO NOT DELETE)

360

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

10/16/2020 12:50 PM

[Vol. 70:333

commentary, while, until now, quasi campaign finance has evaded
sustained academic scrutiny. Quasi campaign finance is much more
voluminous, too, than the dark money that the Supreme Court’s 2010
decision in Citizens United v. FEC legalized.119 Nonprofit entities that
do not disclose their donors make less than $100 million of campaign
expenditures per year.120 These same groups devote perhaps ten times
more resources to quasi campaign finance, which nevertheless draws
only a fraction of the attention.
E. Drivers
If quasi campaign finance warrants as close an examination as
other categories of political spending, then it is important to
understand its drivers: the factors that cause it to go up or down. One
such factor is organizational type. Certain sorts of groups may have a
greater inclination (or ability) to pay for nonelectoral communications
than other kinds of entities. The relevant literature, however, is of two
minds about who is more likely to engage in quasi campaign finance.
More recent studies have noted the vast sums deployed by conservative
nonprofit groups—within the Koch network, in particular 121 —and
compared them to the sparser spending of liberal nonprofits. 122
Political scientist Jason Sclar and his coauthors, for example, tracked
donations to Koch-backed groups and to groups approved by the
liberal Democracy Alliance (“DA”) over a ten-year period. 123 “The
aggregate resources orchestrated by the DA fall far short of those
directed by the Koch seminars,” determined Sclar’s team. 124 “[T]he
Koch seminars are not only raising greater sums than the DA partners,
119. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010). Prior to Citizens United, nonprofit
entities were generally prohibited from making campaign expenditures. Indeed, Citizens United
itself, the plaintiff in the landmark case, is a nonprofit corporation. See id.
120. See Dark Money Basics, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/darkmoney/basics [https://perma.cc/PWL3-UAXY] (showing total dark money spending of nearly
$160 million in both the 2016 and the 2018 two-year federal election cycles, or around $80 million
per year).
121. See, e.g., Skocpol & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 21, at 684–87.
122. See, e.g., Jason Sclar, Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Theda Skocpol & Vanessa
Williamson, Donor Consortia on the Left and Right: Comparing the Membership, Activities, and
Impact of the Democracy Alliance and the Koch Seminars, presented at the Annual Meeting of
the Midwest Political Science Association 4 (Apr. 8, 2016) (transcript available at Papers, HARV.
UNIV., https://terrain.gov.harvard.edu/files/terrain/files/donor_consortia_on_the_left_and_right_
comparing_the_membership_activities_and_impact_of_the_democracy_alliance_and_the_koch_
seminars.pdf?m=1463891744 [https://perma.cc/G8AS-WKM9]).
123. See id. at 40 fig.6.
124. Id. at 4.
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they are channeling those heftier resources to a more compact set of
organizations directly controlled by the Koch network itself.”125
In contrast, earlier studies tended to distinguish between leftleaning public interest groups and labor unions on the one hand, and
right-leaning corporations, trade associations, and professional
associations on the other. Relying on surveys of groups’ activities
rather than audits of their resources, these works found that the former
organizations were more apt to mount grassroots lobbying
campaigns,126 to hold protests,127 to broadcast issue advertising,128 and
to use their websites for political expression.129 These diverging lines of
scholarship may be reconcilable temporally or methodologically.
Temporally, it is possible that liberal groups used to be the biggest
spenders on quasi campaign finance but have been surpassed by
conservative groups over the last couple decades. Methodologically, it
may be that liberal groups have been outgunned all along, and that
earlier studies missed this imbalance by treating all organizations alike,
regardless of the scale of their spending. More research is necessary to
sort between these (and other) explanations.
Another factor that influences the decision to resort to quasi
campaign finance is the broader political environment. Mass
communications with the electorate are expensive (due to the number

125. Id. at 41; see also, e.g., Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Theda Skocpol & Jason Sclar, When
Political Mega-Donors Join Forces: How the Koch Network and the Democracy Alliance Influence
Organized U.S. Politics on the Right and Left, 32 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 127, 144 (2018) (observing
that “the hundreds of millions generated by the Koch seminars exceed DA giving by two- to
threefold”). This analysis, however, does not distinguish between quasi campaign finance and
other kinds of political spending.
126. See, e.g., KOLLMAN, supra note 29, at 41 (“[P]ublic interest groups and labor unions
comprise the bulk of the organizations using outside lobbying tactics, while professional and trade
associations and corporations comprise the bulk of the organizations at the lower end of the
scale.”); Anthony J. Nownes & Krissy Walker DeAlejandro, Lobbying in the New Millennium:
Evidence of Continuity and Change in Three States, 9 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 429, 445 (2009)
(“[L]obbyists for citizen groups . . . tend to rely more on outside lobbying techniques than
lobbyists for business firms . . . .”).
127. See, e.g., Nownes & Freeman, supra note 115, at 100 (“[L]abor, citizen, and
religious/charitable groups are much more likely than corporate, trade/professional, and
intergovernmental groups and lobbyists to say they engage in protest activity.”).
128. See, e.g., Hogan, supra note 12, at 900 (“[C]ompared to professional associations . . .
labor unions are more likely to use [independent spending and issue advertising]” and “citizen
groups . . . are more likely to use issue advertising.”).
129. See, e.g., SCHLOZMAN ET AL., UNHEAVENLY CHORUS, supra note 29, at 403
(“[C]orporations are very unlikely to use their Web sites for political information and activation,”
while “labor unions,” “public interest organizations,” and “organizations on behalf of the poor”
are “quite likely to do so.”).
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of voters who must be reached) and risky (since voters’ reactions to the
messages cannot be perfectly forecast).130 As a result, Professor Frank
Baumgartner and his coauthors showed, after reviewing almost a
hundred policy areas, groups seeking to change the status quo are more
likely to conduct “outside advocacy” and “grassroots advocacy.” 131
These efforts include “organiz[ing] a public relations campaign,”
“mobiliz[ing] the general public,” and “mobiliz[ing] [the groups’ own]
rank-and-file members.” 132 Conversely, actors hoping to preserve
existing laws tend to employ less costly tactics with a narrower range
of possible outcomes.133 These actors are the beneficiaries of the status
quo bias of American politics, and so have less reason to disrupt the
prevailing policy configuration.
The mass nature of quasi campaign finance also makes it a poor
vehicle for addressing obscure or technical issues. Ordinary voters
cannot easily be galvanized about such matters by canvassing, rallies,
commercials, and the like. Consequently, groups communicate more
frequently with the electorate when nonelectoral topics are highly
salient. Across a set of bills debated by a single Congress, “grassroots
advocacy” was “more often used by groups active on high-priority
issues.” 134 Similarly, over a wider range of subjects considered by
Professor Ken Kollman, both the salience and the popularity of policies
correlated with an “outside lobbying index” measuring “the number of
outside lobbying tactics used and the scope of those tactics.”135
An incumbent’s electoral vulnerability is a further aspect of the
political environment that drives the use of quasi campaign finance.
When a politician is secure in her seat, there is little point in
130. See, e.g., Marie Hojnacki & David C. Kimball, The Who and How of Organizations’
Lobbying Strategies in Committee, 61 J. POL. 999, 1003 (1999) (noting the “inherent
unpredictability of grassroots campaigns”).
131. FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, JEFFREY M. BERRY, MARIE HOJNACKI, DAVID C.
KIMBALL & BETH L. LEECH, LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES, AND
WHY 151, 156 (2009).
132. Id. at 156; see also, e.g., Hojnacki & Kimball, supra note 130, at 1019 (“[O]rganizations
advocating a change to the legislative status quo are much more likely than proponents of the
status quo to lobby . . . through the grassroots.”). Of course, quasi campaign finance includes
more than grassroots lobbying.
133. See BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 131, at 156; Hojnacki & Kimball, supra note 130,
at 1020.
134. Hojnacki & Kimball, supra note 130, at 1019.
135. KOLLMAN, supra note 29, at 89–93; see also, e.g., BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 131,
at 158 (finding that “[o]utside advocacy tactics . . . rise from 32 to 57 percent [in frequency] when
we move from the least to the most salient issues”). Again, grassroots lobbying and quasi
campaign finance are not synonymous.
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communicating nonelectorally with voters in that constituency. These
messages rely on electoral mechanisms to be effective (otherwise they
would not be quasi campaign finance), 136 but the mechanisms are
unlikely to succeed when the incumbent is unassailable. On the other
hand, when a politician’s reelection chances are less certain, the
electoral links are more apt to make a difference. In that case, the
incumbent may be more threatened by a group’s future electoral
mobilization, or more sensitive to shifts in the direction or intensity of
public opinion. 137 Consistent with this logic, Professor Kenneth
Goldstein found in a survey of close to a hundred grassroots lobbying
campaigns that groups mostly “targeted those members whom they
viewed as being potentially vulnerable.”138 An in-depth analysis of a
single legislative battle (over the 2003 Medicare prescription drug bill)
confirmed that groups “target their issue advertising buys in areas . . .
where incumbent legislators are electorally vulnerable.”139
The final factor that scholars have tied to the volume of quasi
campaign finance is the legal (as opposed to the political) environment.
Professor Robert Hogan polled more than a thousand groups in almost
forty states about their political activities. 140 He also coded the
contribution limits in each state, which vary from very low to entirely
absent.141 Connecting these two datasets, he determined that groups
treat quasi and regular campaign finance as substitutes, switching from
one to the other as the legal regime changes. Specifically, groups are 12
percent more likely to make independent expenditures and 8 percent
more likely to broadcast issue advertising when contribution limits are
most stringent rather than most lenient.142 Groups’ political efforts are
thus like “a water balloon” that “shifts or adjusts in response to contact
with a barrier.”143 If the balloon is squeezed at one end (due to tighter

136. See supra Part I.A (defining quasi campaign finance).
137. See supra Part I.A (identifying the electoral mechanisms upon which quasi campaign
finance depends for its effectiveness).
138. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 68.
139. Hall & Reynolds, supra note 112, at 901. Once more, neither the grassroots lobbying
studied by Goldstein, nor the issue advertising analyzed by Hall and Reynolds, comprises the
entirety of quasi campaign finance.
140. See Hogan, supra note 12, at 895–97.
141. See id. at 890–92 (referring specifically to PAC contribution limits).
142. See id. at 900–01.
143. Id. at 889. I reiterate that independent expenditures and issue advertising are not the
whole of quasi campaign finance. Hogan’s study is also admittedly “cross-sectional,” and thus
“not ideal for establishing causation.” Id. at 890 n.3. For another scholar positing an inverse
relationship between quasi and regular campaign finance, see Michael S. Kang, The End of
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conventional campaign finance regulations), it swells on the other side
(through more quasi campaign finance).
F. Effects
Distilling the above studies, we may tentatively conclude that
more money is spent on quasi campaign finance by conservative
(rather than liberal) groups, which want to upset the status quo (rather
than maintain it), on higher- (rather than lower-) profile issues, in more
competitive (rather than safer) constituencies, and when ordinary
campaign finance law is stricter (rather than laxer). Now let us turn the
telescope around, from the causes of quasi campaign finance to the
effects it has on voters, on politicians, and on enacted policy.
With respect to the electorate, there is no academic literature on
point. No scholar, that is, has examined how communications about
nonelectoral politics influence mass public opinion. An array of
informed observers, however, believe they do not have much of an
impact. After interviewing many activists, for instance, Goldstein
concluded that grassroots campaigns against the Clinton
administration’s health care proposal did not “chang[e] national public
opinion.”144 “We were trying to move congressional votes, not Gallup
numbers,” a lobbyist explained to Goldstein.145 More recently, Kochnetwork officials have bemoaned their failure to convince voters of
their “goal of advancing a free society.” 146 “[W]e were not able to
educate many in the tea party more about . . . how free markets work,”
remarked one donor. 147 Even the Supreme Court has expressed
skepticism about the efficacy of issue advertising. In the 2007 case of
FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, the Court opined that “[a]n issue ad’s
impact on an election, if it exists at all, will come only after the voters
hear the information and choose—uninvited by the ad—to factor it
into their voting decisions.”148
Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 41 (2012), predicting that, in the wake of Citizens
United, “campaign money [formerly] spent by outside groups on issue advocacy . . . now will be
spent largely on express advocacy in the form of independent expenditures.” Id.
144. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 77.
145. Id.
146. Kenneth P. Vogel, Behind the Retreat of the Koch Brothers’ Operation, POLITICO (Oct.
27, 2016, 5:03 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/koch-brothers-campaign-struggles230325 [https://perma.cc/GR8J-VKR2].
147. Id.
148. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 470 (2007); see also, e.g., Sharon Beder,
Public Relations’ Role in Manufacturing Artificial Grass Roots Coalitions, 43 PUB. RELS. Q. 20,
23 (1998) (noting that “it would be virtually impossible” for “letter-writing campaigns . . . actually
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Assuming these views are correct, why would quasi campaign
finance have so little sway over the electorate? One answer is that
shifting public opinion is simply very difficult. Any given lever must
compete with unforeseen events, media coverage, other actors who
want to move sentiment in a different direction, and the poorly grasped
intricacies of how people make up, and change, their minds. Notably,
a meta-study of regular campaign finance by Professors Joshua Kalla
and David Broockman found that it, too, does not affect voters’ choices
in general elections.149 This null result holds for canvassing, phone calls,
direct mail, and television and online advertising—in short, just about
every tactic in the modern campaign toolkit.150
Another explanation is that many spenders on quasi campaign
finance do not try to communicate with the whole electorate. Instead,
they tend to limit their outreach to a subset of voters: higher
socioeconomic-status individuals whose preferences, the funders
expect, will carry more weight with policymakers.151 As predicted by
this account, when Goldstein created a regression model for being
asked to contact a member of Congress, its output showed that “whites,
males, and the better educated were significantly more likely to receive
a request.”152 Walker’s survey of grassroots lobbying firms, likewise,
indicated that their “requests for citizen engagement are targeted
primarily at pre-existing political activists, strong political participants,
likely voters, and the college educated.”153
Turning from voters to politicians, the anecdotal evidence is again
consistent, only this time it points the other way. Namely, quasi
campaign finance does affect the positions that elected officials take
and the policies they adopt. “In virtually all of [Professor Anthony

to get a majority of the people behind a position” (quoting ROBERT SHERRILL, WHY THEY CALL
IT POLITICS: A GUIDE TO AMERICA’S GOVERNMENT 376 (5th ed. 1990))).
149. See Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman, The Minimal Persuasive Effects of
Campaign Contact in General Elections: Evidence from 49 Field Experiments, 112 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 148, 148 (2018) (analyzing dozens of field experiments). However, campaigns can have
significant effects in primary elections, voter initiatives, and referenda. Id. at 149.
150. Id. at 148.
151. Note that this is still quasi campaign finance because it remains segments of voters
(rather than policymakers) who are contacted.
152. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 114.
153. WALKER, supra note 109, at 11; see also, e.g., KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN, HENRY E.
BRADY & SIDNEY VERBA, UNEQUAL AND UNREPRESENTED: POLITICAL INEQUALITY AND THE
PEOPLE’S VOICE IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 134–36 (2018) (showing that the percentage of
respondents asked to engage in at least one of five political acts rises in tandem with
socioeconomic status).
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Nownes’s] interviews with [grassroots] lobbyists,” he heard that “[t]he
influence of constituent opinion on the behavior of elected officials—
especially legislators—cannot be overestimated.” 154 Congressional
employees surveyed by the Congressional Management Foundation
agreed about “the value of grassroots advocacy campaigns.”155 Huge
majorities of staffers stated that “in-person visits by constituents,”
“[i]ndividualized postal letters,” and “individualized e-mails from
constituents”—all forms of contact often induced by quasi campaign
finance—are “effective strateg[ies] for influencing Members.”156
Fortunately, we have more to go on here than anecdotes.
Professor Daniel Bergan conducted a pair of studies (the latter in
collaboration with Professor Richard Cole) in which state legislators
were randomly assigned to groups that either were or were not the
targets of grassroots lobbying. In the first study, New Hampshire
legislators who received e-mails from anti-smoking activists were
twenty percentage points more likely to vote for a smoke-free
workplace bill.157 In the second experiment, Michigan legislators who
were called by their constituents were twelve points more inclined to
support an anti-bullying bill.158 Bergan thus determined that “outside
lobbying has a large effect on legislative voting,”159 though he and Cole
cautioned that its impact may be weaker when issues “have been on
the public agenda longer,” when “policymakers have prior information
about public opinion,” or when “the policy in question is central to one
or both of the parties’ legislative agendas.”160
Even as to these thornier issues, Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez’s
work suggests that quasi campaign finance moves public policy in the
154. NOWNES, supra note 36, at 79; see also, e.g., WALKER, supra note 109, at 99 (noting the
important role of “in-person visits with public officials, as well as hard-copy letters, phone calls,
emails, and faxes” in “[c]ampaigns focused on shaping legislation”).
155. CONG. MGMT. FOUND., COMMUNICATING WITH CONGRESS: PERCEPTIONS OF CITIZEN
ADVOCACY ON CAPITOL HILL 5 (2011).
156. Fielding, supra note 29, at 770–71; see also, e.g., Nicholas W. Allard, Lobbying Is an
Honorable Profession: The Right to Petition and the Competition to Be Right, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 23, 49 (2008) (reporting similar results from another survey of congressional staff).
157. See Bergan, supra note 15, at 342–43.
158. See Daniel E. Bergan & Richard T. Cole, Call Your Legislator: A Field Experimental
Study of the Impact of a Constituency Mobilization Campaign on Legislative Voting, 37 POL.
BEHAV. 27, 28 (2015).
159. Bergan, supra note 15, at 343.
160. Bergan & Cole, supra note 158, at 37; see also, e.g., Cluverius, supra note 114, at 286–87
(refining Bergan and Cole’s results by showing that a “higher volume” of emails makes
“legislators less willing to take meaningful action on legislation”). I also add my usual caveat that
grassroots lobbying and quasi campaign finance are not identical.
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funders’ preferred direction. In one study, the authors tallied whether
AFP had a paid director in each state as well as whether each state
restricted public-sector union bargaining rights in the wake of the 2010
Republican wave election. 161 The presence of a paid AFP state
director, which is indicative of more intense AFP activity, made it
almost thirty points more likely that union bargaining rights would be
curbed.162 In another analysis, Hertel-Fernandez, Skocpol, and Daniel
Lynch used a more sophisticated scale to measure the strength of both
AFP and some of its sister organizations in each state.163 Shifting from
the least to the most powerful Koch network reduced the probability
of a state expanding Medicaid by fully seventy percentage points.164
Even more strikingly, the public consistently opposed AFP’s
efforts. In no state did a majority back the limitation of public-sector
union bargaining rights; the average level of support was close to 40
percent. 165 An even larger share of respondents (almost two-thirds)
favored Medicaid expansion. 166 Thus whenever AFP succeeded, it
“pull[ed] government policy away from the preferences held by most
Americans and toward those of a smaller group of businesses, activists,
and donors.”167 AFP’s quasi campaign finance, in other words, widened
the gap between what people want and what they actually get from
their representatives.
This presents a bit of a puzzle: How can nonelectoral
communications with voters fail to affect them—the messages’
recipients—while still influencing politicians? One possibility is that,
thanks to the communications, elected officials wrongly think their

161. See Skocpol & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 21, at 694.
162. See id.; see also ALEXANDER HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, STATE CAPTURE: HOW
CONSERVATIVE ACTIVISTS, BIG BUSINESSES, AND WEALTHY DONORS RESHAPED THE
AMERICAN STATES—AND THE NATION 182 (2019) (finding that greater Koch network strength
is associated with a higher likelihood of public employee bargaining cutbacks).
163. See Hertel-Fernandez, Skocpol & Lynch, supra note 4, at 243, 247–48 (using statistical
models and case studies to analyze the impact of the American Legislative Exchange Council
(“ALEC”) and the State Policy Network (“SPN”), in addition to AFP, on the Medicaid expansion
debate in four states).
164. See id. at 254; see also HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, supra note 162, at 202 (finding “a very
strong relationship between levels of [Koch network] strength and coordination and Medicaid
expansion”). The main caveats to these studies are that they are cross-sectional and that Koch
network strength is a function of more than just quasi campaign finance.
165. See Skocpol & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 21, at 694.
166. See HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, supra note 162, at 254 (reporting only a national figure).
167. Id.; see also Skocpol & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 21, at 692 (“Koch network
operations have contributed to growing gaps across issue-areas between GOP policy stands and
majority citizen preferences . . . .”).
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constituents’ views have been swayed, and then adjust their own
stances to align with public opinion as they incorrectly perceive it. This
is not an implausible scenario. In a pioneering study, Broockman and
political scientist Christopher Skovron found that most state legislators
err when asked to estimate their voters’ policy preferences, usually
overestimating these attitudes’ conservatism. 168 This right-wing bias
may arise because Republican constituents are more likely to contact
their representatives than are Democrats.169 The asymmetric pattern of
grassroots contacts, in turn, could well be the product of the higher
conservative spending on quasi campaign finance.170
Another solution to the riddle might be the targeting, noted
above, 171 of higher socioeconomic-status individuals. Nonelectoral
communications may change their minds—or, at least, make issues
more salient for them and easier to link to politicians—while not
impacting the broader electorate. Politicians could then be responsive
to the shifting concerns of these especially influential voters. This story
has anecdotal support; as one grassroots lobbyist said to Goldstein,
members of Congress “spend ninety percent of their time with one
percent of the population,” and “[w]e want[] that one percent to be
people who [are] going to communicate our message.” 172 More
rigorous studies corroborate the story, too. As I have explained in
earlier work, most campaign donors are higher socioeconomic-status
individuals, 173 and elected officials’ voting records almost perfectly

168. See David E. Broockman & Christopher Skovron, Bias in Perceptions of Public Opinion
Among Political Elites, 112 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 542, 547–57 (2018); see also HERTEL-FERNANDEZ,
supra note 162, at 255 (finding that “the average legislator overestimated constituent
conservatism”).
169. See Broockman & Skovron, supra note 168, at 557–59.
170. See supra notes 121–25125 and accompanying text; cf. HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, supra note
162, at 256 (finding that politicians who report relying more heavily on ALEC (the Koch-funded
support group for legislators) are even more mistaken in their views of their constituents’
preferences).
171. See supra notes 151–53153 and accompanying text.
172. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 87.
173. See Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance, supra note 24, at 1474 (noting the
consensus that donors are “overwhelmingly wealthy, highly educated, male, and white” (quoting
PETER L. FRANCIA, JOHN C. GREEN, PAUL S. HERRNSON, LYNDA W. POWELL & CLYDE
WILCOX, THE FINANCIERS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: INVESTORS, IDEOLOGUES, AND
INTIMATES 16 (2003))).
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mirror their donors’ desires while bearing little relation to their
constituents’ views.174
A final answer is the first electoral mechanism I outlined earlier:
the threat of future electoral mobilization. 175 Say that politicians
accurately perceive their voters’ policy preferences. Also assume that
nonelectoral communications do not target any particular group. Quasi
campaign finance could still affect politicians by signaling to them that
the funders could undertake an equivalent effort—only this time, an
electoral one—during the next campaign. For this signal to work,
politicians simply have to want to be elected 176 and to think that
electoral spending makes some difference for their electoral odds.177
As long as these conditions are satisfied, politicians have an incentive
to do what the funders of nonelectoral communications want, even if
these messages are ineffective. The reason is that the messages’
electoral successors, disseminated during the next campaign, may not
be so impotent.
II. THE LEGAL STATUS OF QUASI CAMPAIGN FINANCE
To this point, I have only tried to grasp the concept of quasi
campaign finance: to define it and distinguish it from other kinds of
political activity, to present some examples of it, and to explain what is
known about its scale, causes, and consequences. I have not yet
grappled with the question that is likely the most salient to legal
audiences: May quasi campaign finance constitutionally be regulated
in the same ways as conventional campaign finance? Or, conversely, is
it unregulable under the First Amendment? Thinking through this
question is my object in this Part.
I begin by noting the range of laws that apply to ordinary
campaign finance—disclosure requirements, contribution limits, and,
formerly, expenditure caps—but not to garden-variety political speech.
The validity of these laws, I argue, is best understood as following from
174. See id. at 1476 (summarizing work showing that “the [ideological] distributions of donors
and members of Congress are more or less identical” and “in marked contrast to the normal
distribution of the general public”).
175. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. This threat is also far from an empty one. Many
groups that fund nonelectoral—yet still political—communications pay lavishly for traditional
campaign finance, too. See supra Part I.C.
176. The canonical work presenting politicians as single-minded seekers of reelection is
DAVID MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (2d ed. 2004).
177. As noted above, it is quite unclear if electoral spending actually makes a difference in
general elections. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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the assignment of regular campaign finance to a specialized electoral
domain rather than the general sphere of public discourse. Next, I
consider a number of reasons for equating quasi and conventional
campaign finance: that they (1) share the same functional features and
(2) are partial substitutes, which are both capable of (3) corrupting
officeholders, (4) distorting public opinion, and (5) misaligning
governmental outputs from popular preferences. Some of these
reasons are better than others; together, they render plausible (if not
necessary) the placement of quasi campaign finance in the electoral
domain. Lastly, I address a couple of other classificatory options. Quasi
campaign finance could be located in a different specialized domain: a
policymaking instead of an electoral realm. Quasi campaign finance
could also be conceived as public discourse—but without becoming
unregulable as a result.
Before starting this analysis, I must flag my uncertainty about the
right conclusion. After weighing all the points and ripostes, I remain
unsure what legal status should be assigned to quasi campaign finance.
My goal here is thus to explore rather than to persuade: to probe the
arguments for and against pairing quasi and ordinary campaign
finance, but not definitively to accept or reject them. A further caveat
is that I bracket, for present purposes, the debate over how regular
campaign finance may permissibly be regulated. This is obviously a
vital issue on which oceans of ink have been spilled.178 But I ignore it
here since my interest is the analogy between quasi and conventional
campaign finance, not the legal treatment of the latter.
A. Elections Versus Politics
It is undeniable that ordinary campaign finance is subject to much
more regulation—valid regulation upheld by the Supreme Court—
than generic political speech. In Buckley and Citizens United, the Court
sustained requirements that campaign contributions, 179 express

178. Some of this ink has been my own. I am generally sympathetic to the regulation of regular
campaign finance, at least if the result is closer alignment between voters’ preferences and the
government’s outputs. See Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance, supra note 24, at 1486–
99; see also Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 283, 336–
42 (2014) [hereinafter Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment] (“Under the alignment
approach, then, the central issue for courts assessing campaign finance laws would be the
measures’ capacity to curb the noncongruence that stems from electoral spending and
fundraising.”).
179. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68–74 (1976) (per curiam).
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advocacy, 180 and electioneering communication 181 all be disclosed to
the FEC. The Buckley Court also announced the principle, which still
endures more than forty years later, that contribution limits are
reviewed relatively deferentially and are usually ratified.182 Even bans
on independent expenditures by corporations and unions were good
law for virtually the entire twentieth century 183 —and would still be
allowed today if the four dissenters in Citizens United had prevailed.184
In contrast, standard-issue political speech has never been
restricted like this.185 Neither its content nor its funding typically has to
be reported to any authority. When its disclosure has been mandated,
the Court has been quick to step in and strike down the offending
requirement. 186 Contribution limits and expenditure bans are even
rarer policies in the generic political context. Indeed, it is hard to come
up with good historical examples of such measures187—let alone laws
the Court did or would uphold. Just imagine a ceiling on how much one

180. See id. at 80 (upholding FECA’s disclosure requirements for independent expenditures
after construing them “to reach only funds used for communications that expressly advocate the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate”).
181. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 368–69 (2010) (upholding BCRA’s disclosure
requirements for electioneering communication and refusing to limit them to “express advocacy
and its functional equivalent” (citing FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469–476
(2007))).
182. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20–23. Since Buckley, contribution limits have been invalidated
by the Court on only two occasions. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 193 (2014) (plurality
opinion) (striking down the federal limits on aggregate contributions in an election cycle);
Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 236–37 (2006) (plurality opinion) (striking down Vermont’s
unusually low contribution limits).
183. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 411 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(“State legislatures have relied on their authority to regulate corporate electioneering . . . for
more than a century. The Federal Congress has relied on this authority for a comparable stretch
of time . . . .” (citing Brief for the State of Montana et al. as Amici Curiae Addressing June 29,
2009 Order for Supplemental Briefing and Supporting Neither Party at 5–13, Citizens United, 558
U.S. 310 (No. 08-205); Supplemental Brief of John McCain et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Appellee at 1a–8a, Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (No. 08-205))).
184. See id. at 478–79.
185. By “standard-issue” political speech I mean to exclude regular and quasi campaign
finance as well as direct and grassroots lobbying. See supra Part I.B (discussing these categories).
186. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (striking down
Ohio’s ban on anonymous political pamphleteering); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C.,
487 U.S. 781, 784 (1988) (invalidating North Carolina’s requirement that charitable fundraisers
disclose certain information to potential donors); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958)
(protecting the NAACP’s membership lists from disclosure to the state of Alabama).
187. Coming closest, perhaps, is the Colorado ban on paying circulators of initiative petitions
that the Court invalidated in Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 415–16 (1988). See also Citizens
Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 291, 300 (1981) (striking down California’s
limit on contributions to committees supporting or opposing ballot measures).
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could give to a political group, or a prohibition on one’s own political
spending. There probably has not been a Justice in modern times who
would sustain this sort of regulation.
Why does First Amendment doctrine tolerate restrictions of
regular campaign finance that would be unthinkable for garden-variety
political speech? It could simply be the vagaries of the common law
method.188 Perhaps a series of precedents have accumulated, without
any grand plan, that are particularly sympathetic to constraints on
electoral funding. Path dependency would then account for the
disparate treatment. Another explanation might be the force of the
governmental interests that are advanced by the regulation of
conventional campaign finance. These include preventing politicians
from being corrupted by large sums of electoral funding 189 and
informing voters about the activities of campaign donors and
spenders.190 Maybe these aims are especially compelling and thus able
to justify speech burdens that would otherwise be unacceptable.
Maybe. 191 In my view, though, there is a more persuasive (and
more interesting) reason to distinguish between ordinary campaign
finance and generic political speech. It is that the former may
reasonably be assigned to a specialized electoral domain, while the
latter belongs squarely in the sphere of general public discourse. On
this account, which one might call a partitionist theory of the First
Amendment, 192 there exist multiple zones of human activity, within
which the legal status of speech varies. One of these zones, and
doctrinally the most familiar, is public discourse. 193 Here, people

188. See generally David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 877 (1996) (advocating the virtues of common law constitutional interpretation).
189. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25–29 (1976) (per curiam).
190. See, e.g., id. at 66–67.
191. I am skeptical of both these explanations. The path-dependency hypothesis is
undermined by the fact that the Court’s regular campaign finance decisions very frequently cite
other First Amendment cases. See John O. McGinnis, Neutral Principles and Some Campaign
Finance Problems, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 841, 887–90 (2016). I also do not see why preventing
corruption and informing voters are uniquely compelling goals. They seem no more urgent to me
than many other ends the government pursues.
192. I believe this term is new, but I do not otherwise claim to have developed this theory
myself. For other scholars advancing similar positions, see generally POST, supra note 17; Baker,
supra note 19; Briffault, Issue Advocacy, supra note 19; Neuborne, supra note 19; and Schauer &
Pildes, supra note 19. For a related perspective with respect to all of society, not just the free
speech context, see generally Niklas Luhmann, Differentiation of Society, 2 CAN. J. SOC. 29 (1977).
193. See, e.g., Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (“At the heart of the First
Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and
opinions on matters of public interest and concern.”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
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communicate continuously, ceaselessly, and recursively about matters
of public relevance. Through these exchanges, public opinion is formed
and then reformed in a never-ending cycle. Through this interaction,
too, people come to feel that their government is responsive to their
views. This sense arises because elected officials, just like the people
they represent, are participants in, and observers of, the ongoing public
debate.194
Under this conception, regulation of public discourse is highly
suspect. When the government burdens speech on public issues, it
interferes with the free flow of ideas. Public opinion then emerges not
(wholly) through the voluntary updating of people’s attitudes but
rather (at least in part) thanks to the government’s heavy hand. Even
worse, people may start to believe that their representatives are not
actually responsive to their needs and interests. How can people
maintain their faith, after all, in a state that is hindering their
expression of the very preferences that their elected officials are
supposed to be heeding?195
The crux of the partitionist theory, however, is that not all human
activity is public discourse. Some of it, rather, takes place within
specialized institutional domains that the government itself has
established. Classic examples of these institutions include state-run
schools, workplaces, and prisons, where the government is,
respectively, educator, employer, and jailer. Inside these institutions,
crucially, speech may be lawfully limited in order to promote the
domains’ particular goals. Such restrictions make the institutions work
better, and thus serve the governmental interests that led to their
creation in the first place. Such restrictions also do not cause the same
harms as curbs on public discourse. They do not disrupt the formation

270 (1964) (noting “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)
(praising the “unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people”).
194. In the academy, Post has discussed the nature of public discourse at greatest length and
with the most theoretical sophistication. See generally POST, supra note 17; Robert Post,
Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1109 (1993) [hereinafter Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake]; Robert Post, Regulating Election
Speech Under the First Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1837 (1999) [hereinafter Post, Regulating
Election Speech].
195. As Post has put it, “government restrictions on public discourse potentially impair
democratic legitimation.” POST, supra note 17, at 74. Consequently, “courts may properly prevent
the state from restricting public discourse unless in the service of the most compelling interests.”
Id.
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of public opinion because people’s attitudes on public matters are not
as shaped by their involvement in specialized domains. Nor do the
restrictions result in an erosion of people’s trust in their government’s
responsiveness since this conviction, too, is forged elsewhere.196
Elections, then, are one more institution that may be demarcated
from public discourse. Elections are held only because the government
decides to authorize and administer them. There can be no legally
binding vote in the absence of state action. 197 Elections also have a
series of aims separate from those of public discourse. These include
enabling citizens to deliberate over, and choose between, candidates
for office; encouraging citizens to participate in the electoral process;
accurately tallying voters’ preferences when the moment for decision
arrives; peacefully transferring (or retaining) power in accordance with
voters’ wishes; and motivating elected officials adequately and noncorruptly to represent their constituents. 198 Under the partitionist
theory, it is therefore reasonable to recognize elections as a distinct
institutional domain, run by the government for instrumental ends.199
If elections are carved out of public discourse, then the doctrine’s
seemingly permissive stance toward restrictions of regular campaign
finance ceases to be a mystery. Why are disclosure requirements,
196. I should clarify that these are normative rather than empirical claims. People’s attitudes
on public matters, and their trust in their government’s responsiveness, could be affected by their
involvement in specialized domains. But the partitionist theory assumes they are not so affected
(at least not much). Post, again, addresses so-called “managerial domains” in the most detail. See
POST, supra note 17, at 81–84, 91–92; Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake, supra note 194, at 1128–33; Post,
Regulating Election Speech, supra note 194, at 1840. Other scholars have advanced analogous
claims of specialized institutional domains. See Baker, supra note 19, at 17–19 (discussing
“institutionally bound” speech); Briffault, Issue Advocacy, supra note 19, at 1763 (discussing the
“distinctive jurisprudential regime for election speech”); Neuborne, supra note 19, at 800
(discussing “‘institutionally bounded’ setting[s]”); Schauer & Pildes, supra note 19, at 1805
(discussing “bounded domains of communicative activity”).
197. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court 2003 Term—Forward: The
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29, 51–52 (2004) (“[E]lections
and related democratic processes are pervasively regulated.”).
198. For a thoughtful article comparing the deliberative and tabulative goals of elections, see
generally James A. Gardner, Deliberation or Tabulation? The Self-Undermining Constitutional
Architecture of Election Campaigns, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1413 (2007). I have also discussed the values
served by elections (and election law) in more detail elsewhere. See Stephanopoulos, Elections
and Alignment, supra note 178, at 356–60.
199. For other scholars portraying elections as specialized institutional domains, see supra
note 196. For the Court doing so as well, see Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation,
Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 186–87 (1999), distinguishing between “core political speech” and electoral
speech and remarking that “there must be a substantial regulation of elections . . . if some sort of
order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes” (first quoting Meyer v. Grant,
486 U.S. 414, 422 (1988); then quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
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contribution limits, and (formerly) certain expenditure bans valid
when they apply to electoral funding but invalid when they extend to
generic political speech? Precisely because when they apply to
electoral funding, they operate within the electoral domain, where
more regulation is allowed. When they extend to generic political
speech, conversely, they amount to burdens on public discourse that
are, for that reason, subject to stringent scrutiny.
I should acknowledge that the partitionist theory is not without its
critics. Scholars including Lillian BeVier, 200 John McGinnis, 201
Geoffrey Stone,202 and Kathleen Sullivan203 have argued that elections
should be conceived as part of—not apart from—public discourse
because electoral and political speech cannot be disentangled. In
McGinnis’s words, the partitionist theory “wrongly suggests that
expression at election time can be segregated from the political debate
that is ever-billowing in a democracy.” 204 On the Court, similarly,
several Justices have opposed erecting a boundary between elections
on the one side and politics on the other. This “line between electoral
advocacy and issue advocacy dissolves in practice,” according to Justice
Antonin Scalia, 205 because “discussions of candidates and issues are
quite often intertwined,” as Justice Anthony Kennedy has put it.206
Since the partitionist theory has been ably defended elsewhere,207
I only want to make one observation here about these attacks: they are
normative, not descriptive, and so do not undermine the theory’s
ability to explain current First Amendment law. The attacks’ common

200. See Lillian R. BeVier, The Issue of Issue Advocacy: An Economic, Political, and
Constitutional Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1761, 1773 (1999) (arguing that Buckley “eschewed the
notion [of] a dichotomy between free politics generally and elections in particular as bounded
institutions”).
201. See McGinnis, supra note 191, at 908.
202. See Geoffrey R. Stone, “Electoral Exceptionalism” and the First Amendment: A Road
Paved with Good Intentions, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 665, 673 (2011) (portraying
“electoral speech” as “largely indistinguishable from general public discourse”).
203. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 663, 674–75 (1997) (“[E]lections are seamlessly connected to the informal political debates
that continue in the periods between them.”).
204. McGinnis, supra note 191, at 908.
205. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 494 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring).
206. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 327 (2003) (Kennedy, J. concurring), overruled by
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Buckley also stated at one point that “[a]dvocacy of
the election or defeat of candidates . . . is no less entitled to protection under the First
Amendment than the discussion of political policy generally or advocacy of the passage or defeat
of legislation.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) (per curiam).
207. See supra note 196.

STEPHANOPOULOS IN PRINTER FINAL(DO NOT DELETE)

376

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

10/16/2020 12:50 PM

[Vol. 70:333

theme is that an electoral domain should not be demarcated from
public discourse because electoral speech should be seen as equivalent
to political speech. This may or may not be correct; I think it is not. But
even if it is right, it only means that contemporary doctrine should be
amended to eliminate the greater deference that restrictions on
conventional campaign finance receive at present. It does not change
the fact that these restrictions do currently receive greater deference
than analogous limits on garden-variety political speech. It does not
change the fact, that is, that contemporary doctrine adheres to the
partitionist theory.208
B. Assignment to the Electoral Domain
This adherence forms the backdrop for my core inquiry in this
Part: analyzing whether quasi campaign finance should be assigned to
the electoral domain (along with ordinary campaign finance) or to
public discourse (joining generic political speech). As the preceding
discussion makes clear, the stakes of this choice are high. If quasi
campaign finance is placed in the electoral domain, then it may
permissibly be regulated to further that domain’s ends. But if quasi
campaign finance is part of public discourse, then it is largely
unregulable. As I also noted above, I do not come down firmly on one
side or the other of this difficult debate. 209 I develop the dueling
arguments without trying to adjudicate between them.
1. Characteristics. One reason to equate quasi and regular
campaign finance is that they share several key characteristics. Both
activities are paid for primarily by the same actors, namely, wealthy,
ideologically extreme, and politically active individuals. They make
most contributions to candidates210 and provide the bulk of the funding
for entities, such as super PACs, that engage in independent electoral

208. I readily concede that, post-Citizens United, contemporary doctrine does not reflect the
partitionist theory to the extent that it did before the decision. The Court used to distinguish
between electoral expenditures by corporations and unions (which were banned) and
nonelectoral spending by these entities (which was permitted). The Court no longer makes this
distinction. Buckley, too, did not adhere to the partitionist theory when it treated electoral
expenditures by individuals identically to their nonelectoral spending, prohibiting restrictions on
the former.
209. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
210. See Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance, supra note 24, at 1474–76
(summarizing the literature on campaign donors).

STEPHANOPOULOS IN PRINTER FINAL(DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

QUASI CAMPAIGN FINANCE

10/16/2020 12:50 PM

377

spending.211 They are also the main donors to the 501(c)(4) groups that
are the most active practitioners of quasi campaign finance.212 Not only
do quasi and conventional campaign finance have analogous funding
sources, they pay for analogous tactics, too. Electoral money funds
television and online advertisements, fundraising solicitations, door-todoor canvassing, phone banking, speeches, rallies, and protests. The
same goes for nonelectoral, yet still political, money.213 In both cases,
spenders purchase mass communications with voters.
Furthermore, quasi and ordinary campaign finance rely on similar
mechanisms to be effective. When electoral money has an impact, it is
through its influence on either voters or politicians. It may convince
voters to support (or oppose) a candidate, or to go to (or stay home
from) the polls. It may also prod politicians to do what the funders
want, whether out of gratefulness for the funders’ resources or fear of
how these resources could be weaponized in the future. Likewise with
nonelectoral, yet still political, money. As I explained earlier, it
depends on electoral links involving either voters or politicians to
achieve its aims.214 It may change voters’ minds about an issue or make
that issue more salient and easier to connect to candidates. Voters’
behavior at the polls may then shift as a result. Quasi campaign finance
may also sway politicians thanks to its convertibility down the road into
regular campaign finance, to which politicians are famously attuned.
To make this discussion more concrete, consider two recent ads
aired by AFP. One of them, paid for by conventional campaign finance,
criticized then-Senator Joe Donnelly of Indiana for saying “he’d
support tax cuts for hard-working Hoosiers” but then “voting against
tax cuts for you.”215 It added that viewers should “tell Senator Donnelly
to put Hoosier jobs first.”216 The other commercial, underwritten by

211. Compare Top Individuals Funding Outside Spending Groups, supra note 92 (showing the
biggest individual donors to outside spending groups in the 2018 election cycle), with Top
Organizations Funding Outside Spending Groups, supra note 92 (showing the biggest
organizational donors).
212. See supra notes 121–25125 and accompanying text (noting that the Koch network and
the Democracy Alliance are both comprised of individual donors).
213. See supra Part I.C (providing examples of these tactics in the quasi campaign finance
context).
214. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
215. Ams. for Prosperity, Senator Donnelly Voted Against Tax Cuts for Hoosiers, YOUTUBE
(Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8gnB6HYFhos [https://perma.cc/FTL3-ZPJA].
216. Id. Note that this ad, while obviously electoral, is neither express advocacy (since it
avoids the use of magic words) nor electioneering communication (since it was aired too long
before the next election).
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quasi campaign finance, warned that “some members of Congress want
a new trillion-dollar [border adjustment] consumer tax that could drive
up your costs and hurt our economy.”217 It continued: “Tell Congress
that’s not the change we’re asking for.”218
These ads were both funded by AFP. They were both also, well,
ads—broadcast messages directed at large numbers of voters. Their
subject matter and policy perspective were identical too: Tax cuts are
good; tax hikes are bad. And if they had any effect, it was via voters or
politicians. The first ad may have persuaded voters to oppose Senator
Donnelly (who ended up losing his 2018 reelection bid) while
incentivizing Senator Donnelly to modify his stance on taxes. The
second ad may have caused voters and members of Congress alike to
disfavor the border adjustment tax proposal that was floated in 2017.219
Voters’ views might have shifted on the merits of the proposal, while
members of Congress could have changed their stances out of concern
about voters’ or AFP’s future actions. This is obviously a substantial
list of similarities. It cuts in favor of treating quasi and ordinary
campaign finance symmetrically under the First Amendment due to
their overlapping features.
Nor is this form of functional reasoning alien to the Supreme
Court. In the 2003 case of McConnell v. FEC, the Court evaluated
BCRA’s extension of the existing regulations of express advocacy—
namely, disclosure requirements and a ban on corporate and union
spending—to electioneering communication. 220 The Court held that
the
extension
was
constitutional
because
electioneering
communication substantively resembled express advocacy. “[T]he two
categories of advertisements proved functionally identical in important
respects.” 221 “Both were used to advocate the election or defeat of
clearly identified federal candidates, even though the so-called issue
ads,” most of which were electioneering communication, “eschewed
the use of magic words.” 222 The Court thus denied that “the First

217. Ams. for Prosperity Comm., Tell Congress That’s Not the Change We’re Asking for,
(Apr. 17, 2017), https://ispot.tv/a/wL1_ [https://perma.cc/38SJ-YMEW].
218. Id.
219. See Timothy M. Todd, What Is a Border Adjustment Tax?, FORBES (Jan. 17, 2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/timtodd/2017/01/17/what-is-a-border-adjustment-tax/#2febddc2bc1b
[https://perma.cc/4AKP-SVJH].
220. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 189–202 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
221. Id. at 126.
222. Id.

ISPOT.TV
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Amendment erects a rigid barrier between express advocacy and socalled issue advocacy.”223
A future, differently constituted Court could make an equivalent
move with respect to quasi and regular campaign finance. Since they
share the same funders, pay for the same kinds of communications, and
rely on electoral mechanisms involving the same voters and politicians,
they could be ascribed the same legal status. True, quasi and
conventional campaign finance are not alike in every way, since the
latter is and the former is not overtly electoral. But electioneering
communication and express advocacy are not identical either, since the
latter does and the former does not necessarily use magic words. This
contrast did not prove dispositive in McConnell, and neither must the
electoral distinction between quasi and ordinary campaign finance.
On the other hand, the relevant portion of McConnell is no longer
good law. In Wisconsin Right to Life, the Court “reject[ed] the
contention,” which it had accepted in McConnell, that “issue advocacy
may be regulated because express election advocacy may be.”224 Also
disagreeing with McConnell, the Court held that some ads that are
electioneering communication “are not the functional equivalent of
express advocacy.”225 Therefore the state interests that authorize limits
on express advocacy “cannot justify regulating” these messages.226
More importantly here, the electoral distinction between quasi
and regular campaign finance is hardly trivial. The issue at hand is
whether quasi campaign finance should be located in the electoral
domain. It is plainly a strike against this placement that quasi campaign
finance is, by definition, nonelectoral. Yes, quasi campaign finance
223. Id. at 193. Interestingly, Justice Clarence Thomas has made a similar functional argument
for treating contribution and expenditure limits symmetrically—and presumptively striking them
both down. See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 636 (1996)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“When an individual donates money . . . he
enhances the donee’s ability to communicate a message and thereby adds to political debate, just
as when that individual communicates the message himself.”). In the academy, Heather Gerken
and Alex Tausanovitch have urged the pairing of campaign finance and lobbying because they
are “both important means of converting money into political influence.” Heather K. Gerken &
Alex Tausanovitch, A Public Finance Model for Lobbying: Lobbying, Campaign Finance, and the
Privatization of Democracy, 13 ELECTION L.J. 75, 75 (2014); see also Richard Briffault, Lobbying
and Campaign Finance: Separate and Together, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 105, 112 (2008)
[hereinafter Briffault, Lobbying] (“Both lobbying and campaign finance are means to the end of
influence over government action.”).
224. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 477 (2007) (citing McConnell, 550 U.S. at
205).
225. Id. at 478.
226. Id. at 479.
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shares other characteristics of conventional campaign finance: its
funding sources, its messaging tactics, its underlying mechanisms, and
so on. But it does not exhibit the feature that arguably defines ordinary
campaign finance: the fact that it pays for communications that are
actually about elections.
It is also significant that the mechanisms underpinning quasi
campaign finance are less directly electoral than those on which regular
campaign finance depends. When electoral money influences voters or
politicians, it does so without any intervening steps. Voters’ electoral
preferences change, and politicians’ behavior shifts, too, because of the
immediate electoral consequences they perceive. In contrast, when
nonelectoral money has an electoral impact, it does so at one remove.
It sways voters’ nonelectoral attitudes, which may, in turn, affect their
electoral views. Or it puts politicians on notice that while this policyfocused campaign may not help or hurt them, a future electoral
mobilization could be relevant to their careers. These are real electoral
mechanisms—but they are also more complex, more attenuated links
than those of conventional campaign finance.
Lastly, it is unclear what the stopping point is for the argument
that quasi campaign finance is similar enough functionally to ordinary
campaign finance that it should be treated like it legally. Take mass
communications that do not rely on electoral connections to be
effective, like requests that people give money to protect the
environment or to fight disease.227 These messages are often funded by
politically active nonprofit groups, and they use many of the same
methods as regular campaign finance (here, fundraising solicitations).
Why should these parallels not be enough to assign these
communications, too, to the electoral domain? Or consider reports
from think tanks about political issues. While these publications rarely
target the mass electorate, their funding commonly comes from the
same sources as conventional campaign finance, and they certainly
hope to make an electoral difference.228 So are they part of the electoral
domain as well?
These questions are rhetorical. These activities cannot be situated
in the electoral domain, because if they were, then not much speech
would remain within public discourse. But that is precisely the point. If

227. Here, the requested funding is the operative mechanism. If money is donated, it will be
used directly to advance the group’s aims.
228. For example, the State Policy Network is a constellation of conservative think tanks
funded in part by the Koch brothers. See HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, supra note 162, at 146–60.
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the electoral domain can be stretched to include quasi campaign
finance, it is hard to explain why its boundaries cannot be enlarged a
little more, to cover activities a bit further afield. Once the expansion
project begins, in other words, there is no obvious point at which it
ends.229
2. Substitutability. A related reason for conferring the same legal
status to quasi and ordinary campaign finance is that they are partial
substitutes for each other. In particular, if more restrictions are
imposed on electoral money, its suppliers may respond by shifting their
efforts to nonelectoral, yet still political, spending.230 This reallocation
is feasible because, as discussed above, quasi and regular campaign
finance share several key characteristics.231 These overlapping features
mean that funders may still accomplish their objectives even if they are
obliged to pay for quasi instead of conventional campaign finance. The
overlap also suggests that quasi and ordinary campaign finance should
be treated—and regulated—equally by the law. Otherwise, savvy
funders could circumvent limits on electoral money simply by switching
to its nonelectoral cousin.232
Charles Koch is one prominent advocate of the substitutability
thesis. To repeat an earlier quote, he sees “education,” “grassroots
organizations,” “lobbying,” and “political action” as components of “a
strategy that is vertically and horizontally integrated,” among which
resources may be freely shuffled. 233 The Koch network’s activities
reflect this view. They include not just the quasi campaign finance I
have emphasized here, 234 but also a good deal of regular campaign
finance, 235 both of whose volumes ebb and flow from year to year.
229. See, e.g., Post, Regulating Election Speech, supra note 194, at 1842 (“If all that were
necessary to bring speech within the authority of a managerial domain were that the speech
produce effects on the domain, nothing much would be left of public discourse.”).
230. See supra notes 140–43143 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 210–19 and accompanying text.
232. For other scholars making substitutability arguments, except in the context of campaign
finance and lobbying, see Briffault, Lobbying, supra note 223, at 111–12 (“Both lobbying and
campaign finance are means to the end of influencing our government action.”); Gerken &
Tausanovitch, supra note 223, at 75 (commenting that they “function as substitutes and
complements within a democratic system”).
233. MAYER, supra note 2, at 173.
234. See supra notes 55–73 and accompanying text.
235. For example, AFP spent nearly $37 million on independent expenditures in the 2012
election, making it one of the election’s ten biggest spenders. See 2012 Outside Spending, by
Group, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=
2012&chrt=V &disp=O&type=A [https://perma.cc/UQ7S-QANE].
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Further support for the substitutability claim comes from the academy.
Hogan, again, found that when state contribution limits become
tighter, groups respond by spending more on independent
expenditures and issue advertising. 236 Less conventional campaign
finance, that is, leads to more quasi campaign finance.
The McConnell Court, too, embraced the logic that Congress may
restrict electioneering communication to prevent groups from evading
the (then-applicable) ban on express advocacy by corporations and
unions. Surveying the era before BCRA, the Court observed that
electioneering communication “accomplished the same purposes as
express advocacy,” and thus “enabled unions, corporations, and
wealthy contributors to circumvent protections that FECA was
intended to provide.” 237 More generally, the Court held that the
potential replacement of one form of campaign finance by another is a
valid reason to regulate them both. “[I]nterests” that are “sufficient to
justify” certain limits also vindicate “laws preventing the
circumvention of such limits.”238
Once more, though, this position did not survive the Court’s
subsequent decision in Wisconsin Right to Life. In that case, the Court
pointed out that campaign finance restrictions are prophylactic, since
most electoral money is not corruptive or otherwise invidious.239 The
Court then noted that efforts to prevent restrictions from being
circumvented, through the transfer of funds from one use to another,
are prophylactic as well. 240 “[S]uch a prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis
approach to regulating expression,” the Court concluded, “is not
consistent with strict scrutiny.”241 The multiple layers of prevention are
overkill for achieving any governmental interest.
Also undermining the argument for equal legal status due to
substitutability is that quasi and ordinary campaign finance may not, in
fact, be very good substitutes. If they were suitable alternatives, then
one would expect to see similar amounts of each activity at all times.
There would be no reason for funders to prefer one activity over the
236. See Hogan, supra note 12, at 900–01.
237. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 131 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558
U.S. 310 (2010); see id. at 129 (noting that, before BCRA, “political parties and candidates used
the availability of so-called issue ads to circumvent FECA’s limitations”).
238. Id. at 144; see also FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 456
(2001) (“[A]ll Members of the Court agree that circumvention is a valid theory of corruption.”).
239. See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 479 (2007).
240. See id.
241. Id.
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other if they could be swapped without much loss of effectiveness. In
reality, however, Professor Richard Hasen discovered a huge
imbalance when he examined issue advertising during the periods
before two federal elections.242 The vast majority of commercials were
sham issue ads—that is, electoral ads—and only a tiny fraction were
true issue ads underwritten by quasi campaign finance.243 A perusal of
AFP’s library of commercials paints the same picture. 244 When an
election is near, most of the spots are electoral; when no vote is
imminent, the ads typically mention issues but not candidates. 245
Despite Charles Koch’s comments, AFP thus exhibits clear
preferences about when to use quasi and regular campaign finance. It
does not behave as if the activities are interchangeable.
A final concern about the substitutability argument is that it may
sweep too broadly. This worry arises because quasi campaign finance
is not the only partial substitute for conventional campaign finance.
The direct lobbying of elected officials, the publication of reports by
think tanks, mass communications with voters that do not rely on
electoral mechanisms—all these activities serve the ends of those who
supply electoral funding, more or less well, and so could replace that
funding if it were limited, more or less effectively. Consider again the
multitudinous efforts of the Koch network, which span quasi and
ordinary campaign finance, the lobbying of state and federal officials,
support for the sixty-plus conservative think tanks in the State Policy
Network (“SPN”), and backing for the American Legislative Exchange
Council (“ALEC”), the country’s main supplier of right-wing
legislative language. 246 If the Koch network’s quasi and regular
campaign finance were curtailed, it would likely devote more resources
to lobbying, to SPN’s think tanks, and to ALEC’s draft bills. These
activities could therefore be curbed themselves, on an anti-

242. See Hasen, supra note 41, at 1795–99 (studying the 1998 and 2000 elections, both of which
preceded BCRA).
243. Specifically, true issue ads made up about 7 percent of ads in 1998, and 2 percent in 2000.
See id. at 1796.
244. See Americans for Prosperity, YOUTUBE, https://m.youtube.com/user/AforP/videos
[https://perma.cc/7Y4N-7JRE] (last updated Aug. 2020).
245. See id.
246. For detailed discussions of the Koch network, see generally HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, supra
note 162, Skocpol & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 21, and Vogel, Koch Network, supra note 59.
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circumvention theory, but that is just the problem. The theory drags
too much speech from public discourse into the electoral domain.247
3. Anti-Corruption. The above rationales for treating quasi and
conventional campaign finance symmetrically did not involve the
governmental interests that might justify their regulation. I now turn to
these interests, starting with the most doctrinally prominent of them,
the prevention of corruption.248 The Supreme Court’s understanding of
corruption has famously fluctuated.249 Around the time of Buckley and
then again in recent years, the Court conceived of corruption narrowly,
as explicit quid pro quo exchanges and nothing more.250 In the 1990s
and early 2000s, in contrast, the Court embraced a broader notion of
corruption encompassing funders’ undue access to, and influence over,
elected officials.251
Under either of these definitions, could quasi campaign finance be
corruptive (in which case it could be restricted to prevent the
corruption from occurring)? Certainly. Nonelectoral, yet still political,
spending has at least some value for candidates. Because its value is
not zero, candidates might plausibly do something in return for the
spending. If that something is a specific act tied overtly to the spending,
then we have a classic quid pro quo—a transaction even the current
Court would think corrupt. If the something is a little subtler, like
greater contact with, or responsiveness to, the payors of the quasi
campaign finance, then today’s Court would be unperturbed—but the
rest of us need not be. Like the Court of the 1990s and early 2000s, we
247. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 203, at 688 (“[G]rim efforts to close down every ‘loophole’
in campaign finance laws will inevitably trench unacceptably far upon current conceptions of
freedom of political speech.”).
248. According to the contemporary Court, indeed, this is the “only one legitimate
governmental interest for restricting campaign finances.” McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 206
(2014) (plurality opinion).
249. See, e.g., id. at 208 (“[W]e have not always spoken about corruption in a clear or
consistent voice.” (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 447 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part))).
250. See, e.g., id. at 207 (“Congress may target only a specific type of corruption—‘quid pro
quo’ corruption.”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1976) (per curiam) (“To the extent that
large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office
holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined.”).
251. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153–54 (2003) (holding that the “sale of access”
and “undue influence” are “[j]ust as troubling to a functioning democracy as classic quid pro quo
corruption”), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Nixon v. Shrink Mo.
Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000) (recognizing “a concern not confined to bribery of public
officials, but extending to the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of
large contributors”).
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could deem it corrupt when these payors enjoy access and influence
that ordinary voters do not.252
Suppose, for example, that Steyer’s NextGen America is
considering spending $1 million in a congressional district to inform
voters about climate change and to urge them to support policies to
mitigate it. Suppose, too, that the Democratic candidate in this district
believes this spending would increase her odds of being elected, and so
promises Steyer to vote for anti-climate change legislation if NextGen
America opens its coffers. This would be a quid pro quo that virtually
everybody would label a corrupt exchange. Imagine, instead, that the
Democratic candidate makes no explicit pledges, but still meets
repeatedly with Steyer, echoes NextGen America’s rhetoric, and
eventually votes for the group’s preferred bills. The current Court
would no longer be alarmed, but other observers might reasonably
object to “politicians too compliant with the wishes of large [funders],”
as a different Court described corruption in 2000.253
It is worth stressing just how untroubled today’s Court would be
by this scenario. In Citizens United, the Court held that independent
electoral expenditures cannot “give rise to corruption.” 254 This is
because these expenditures allegedly “do not lead to . . . quid pro quo
corruption,” and “there is only scant evidence that [they] even
ingratiate.” 255 “Ingratiation and access, in any event, are not
corruption.”256 It is indisputable, given this reasoning, that the current
Court would not find nonelectoral spending to be corruptive either. If
expenditures about elections necessarily do not corrupt, there is no way
that spending about nonelectoral issues could be invidious.
As a predictive matter, this is true enough. Today’s Court would
not agree that quasi campaign finance could ever be corruptive.
Logically, though, this position is untenable. Nonelectoral, yet still
political, spending could plainly be the funder’s quid that is traded for
the politician’s quo. Since quasi campaign finance benefits the
politician to at least some extent, she might be willing to swap

252. As Justice Kennedy noted in McConnell (albeit disapprovingly), under the broader
definition of corruption, “Congress would have the authority to outlaw even pure issue ads,
because they, too, could endear their sponsors to candidates who adopt the favored positions.”
540 U.S. at 329 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
253. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. at 389.
254. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357.
255. Id. at 360.
256. Id.; see also, e.g., id. at 359 (“The fact that speakers may have influence over or access to
elected officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt . . . .”).
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something for it. Even more clearly, nonelectoral spending could result
in greater access and influence for its funder. This is not corruption,
according to the current Court, but that is just its ipse dixit. It is
corruption according to many others, including this Court’s own
predecessors.257
Nevertheless, it must be conceded that quasi campaign finance is
less valuable to candidates, dollar for dollar, than other kinds of
funding. Compare a given sum of quasi campaign finance, of
independent electoral expenditures, and of campaign contributions.
This dollar amount would be most prized by candidates when it takes
the form of donations that they may use as they please, based on their
own assessments of their races. The pool of money would be somewhat
less helpful as independent electoral spending that reiterates
candidates’ messages but is not under their direct control.258 And the
funding would be least desirable as independent nonelectoral spending
that is both beyond candidates’ control and not aimed directly at
electing them.
The upshot is that quasi campaign finance cannot be as corruptive
as regular campaign finance. It can provide some benefit to candidates,
so its ability to tempt them from their duties is not nil. But this capacity
is limited, compared to independent electoral expenditures and,
especially, campaign contributions, by the weaker dollar-for-dollar
punch of nonelectoral spending. Rational candidates would therefore
be less likely to exchange access and influence, let alone outright
promises, for quasi campaign finance. Even if they did make such deals,
they probably would not be willing to part with as much. A smaller quid
would merit, at most, a similarly minor quo.259

257. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The 527 Problem . . . and the Buckley Problem, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 949, 994 (2005) (“[I]ndependent expenditures provide candidates with sufficient
benefit that they are grateful for the expenditures and inclined to reward the independent
spenders with preferential access, if not government decisions . . . .”); supra note 251 and
accompanying text.
258. As the Buckley Court observed, “[I]ndependent expenditures may well provide little
assistance to the candidate’s campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive.” Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976) (per curiam). See also, e.g., Kang, supra note 143, at 44 (“Even if
independent expenditures are valuable to candidates and parties, contributions are better dollar
for dollar.”).
259. See supra note 250. Probably for this reason, there is no evidence that grassroots lobbying
is linked to corruption. “[T]here is not a demonstrated or widely accepted connection between
spending on such efforts and improper actions by the government officials ultimately contacted.”
Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Politics and the Public’s Right To Know, 13 ELECTION L.J. 138, 157–58
(2014).
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One more (by now familiar260) point about the argument that quasi
and conventional finance warrant the same legal status because they
may both be corruptive: this claim does not distinguish quasi campaign
finance from other types of political communications that may also be
useful to candidates. Take a think tank report that praises a politician’s
proposal or bashes her opponent’s ideas. Or a draft bill provided to a
legislator, which she may then introduce and thereby cement her
reputation as a policy entrepreneur. These materials have at least some
value for candidates, who may agree, for that reason, to trade
something for them. But if we brand these transactions as corrupt—
and, consequently, authorize the regulation of the potentially
corruptive materials—then we have again expanded the electoral
domain beyond any sensible boundary. We have again allowed it to
swallow much of public discourse.
4. Anti-Distortion. Another harm that many have linked to
ordinary campaign finance is the distortion of public opinion. Electoral
expenditures, on this view, may affect voters’ candidate preferences,
shifting them from what they would have been had there been equal,
less, or no spending. In Justice Wiley Rutledge’s words in a 1948 case,
“large expenditures” may “bring about an undue, that is . . . a
disproportionate sway, of electoral sentiment.” 261 The prevention of
such distortion may thus be a legitimate governmental interest that
justifies the restriction of regular campaign finance. As the Supreme
Court put it in the 1990 case of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, a law may validly target “the corrosive and distorting
effects of immense aggregations of wealth” on the electorate.262
Quasi campaign finance could plausibly skew public opinion in the
same ways as conventional campaign finance. In particular, when
voters are persuaded by nonelectoral spending, their revised views

260. See supra notes 227–29, 246–247 and accompanying text.
261. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 143 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring) (summarizing,
but not agreeing with, the government’s position in the case); see also, e.g., FEC v. Mass. Citizens
for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986) (discussing “the corrosive influence of concentrated
corporate wealth” on “the integrity of the marketplace of political ideas”); United States v. UAW,
352 U.S. 567, 582 (1957) (noting “the corroding effect of money employed in elections by
aggregated power”).
262. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Com., 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990), overruled by Citizens United
v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see also, e.g., David Cole, First Amendment Antitrust: The End of
Laissez-Faire in Campaign Finance, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 236, 238–39 (1991) (praising the
Austin Court for upholding “limited government intervention designed to correct the distorting
effects of corporate wealth”).
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could be considered distorted. In this case, the views are not what they
would have been had the spending not occurred. Even when quasi
campaign finance merely heightens the salience of certain issues, the
result could be seen as distortion. Here, too, the pattern of voters’
attention differs from how it would have looked in the absence of the
activity.
These effects, moreover, are exactly what spenders on quasi
campaign finance want. Through their expenditures, they hope to
change voters’ minds and to get them to focus more on particular
policies. If the payors were to fail to sway public opinion, they would
surely be disappointed. An adviser to Charles Koch, for instance, has
said that he “see[s] politicians [not] as setting the prevalent ideology
but as reflecting it.” 263 “This explain[s] the Kochs’ political modus
operandi”: trying to mold the mass ideology that politicians will then
mirror. 264 The political director of Steyer’s NextGen America,
similarly, has remarked that the group seeks to “make a real
connection” with voters about “how climate hits them at the household
level.”265 If voters’ attitudes about the environment were unaltered by
the group’s communications, these messages would be judged
unsuccessful.
Unfortunately for Koch and Steyer, quasi campaign finance does
not appear to influence voters’ views significantly. 266 As I explained
earlier, this could be because public opinion is generally quite difficult
to move.267 Or it could be because most nonelectoral communications
are directed at higher socioeconomic-status individuals who make up a
relatively narrow slice of the electorate.268 Whatever the reason, the
empirical case for regulating quasi campaign finance because of its
distortive impact is weak. Nonelectoral messages simply do not seem
to cause much distortion. Accordingly, the governmental interest in
unskewing public opinion—in restoring it to the configuration it would
otherwise have exhibited—cannot be very compelling. There is no
urgent need to solve a problem that isn’t there.

263. DANIEL SCHULMAN, SONS OF WICHITA: HOW THE KOCH BROTHERS BECAME
AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL AND PRIVATE DYNASTY 255 (2014) (ebook).
264. Id.
265. Evan Halper, Climate Change a Wedge Issue in 2014? Billionaire Tom Steyer Hopes So,
L.A. TIMES (May 21, 2014, 9:00 PM), https://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-pn-steyer20140521-story.html [https://perma.cc/ED8M-77S3].
266. See supra notes 144–48148 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 152–53 and accompanying text.

STEPHANOPOULOS IN PRINTER FINAL(DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

QUASI CAMPAIGN FINANCE

10/16/2020 12:50 PM

389

But suppose there is a problem. Suppose that quasi campaign
finance is capable of materially shifting voters’ attitudes. Even then, it
is hard to call this distortion unless one can first identify an undistorted
baseline: a normatively attractive benchmark to which the status quo
may be compared. What this baseline should be, however, is far from
clear. Should it be a world where AFP and NextGen America do not
spend any money at all? One where they spend as much as every other
political organization? One where they do not outspend other groups
by more than a certain multiple? Or, as the Court suggested in Austin,
one where their resources are proportional to the popularity of their
ideas? 269 There is obviously no consensus on the correct answer.
Without agreement, though, it borders on the incoherent to speak of
distortion. Distortion is inherently a relative concept, one that
condemns a state of affairs for deviating from some ideal. If we do not
know the ideal, then we also do not know how far—or even whether—
the status quo diverges from it.270
But assume away this objection as well. Assume, in other words,
that quasi campaign finance does change voters’ preferences, and that
we can measure the resulting gap between actual and undistorted
public opinion. A further difficulty remains: the slippery slope from
quasi campaign finance to other forms of political expression that may
also affect how voters think. Without more evidence, it is uncertain
how long this slide is—that is, how much more speech has an impact on
public opinion and so may be labeled distortive. But if we are positing
(against the weight of the available facts 271 ) that quasi campaign
finance skews voters’ stances, it is only reasonable to imagine that
many other messages are similarly influential: fundraising solicitations,
white papers, fact and opinion journalism, and so on. 272 All of this
communication, then, could be regulated on the same anti-distortive
basis as quasi campaign finance. As Chief Justice John Roberts
269. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Com., 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (endorsing the idea “that
expenditures reflect actual public support for the political ideas espoused by [campaign
spenders]”), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
270. For other scholars criticizing the concept of distortion on this basis, see POST, supra note
17, at 53 (“There is thus no ‘baseline’ from which ‘distortion’ can be assessed.”) and Lillian R.
BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance
Reform, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1045, 1078 (1985) (“‘Distortion,’ of course, implies a norm, but
reformers scarcely describe or defend the norm upon which they rely.”).
271. See supra notes 144–48 and accompanying text.
272. For a recent study supporting this assumption, see Gregory J. Martin & Ali Yurukoglu,
Bias in Cable News: Persuasion and Polarization, 107 AM. ECON. REV. 2565, 2565–66 (2017)
(finding that Fox News viewership leads to a higher likelihood of Republican voting).
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observed in Citizens United, “[t]he First Amendment theory
underlying Austin’s holding” might “authorize government prohibition
of political speech” even “outside the original context of corporate
advocacy.”273
Lastly, for those who are impressed by doctrinal points, it is
relevant that Citizens United did not just criticize the anti-distortion
interest invoked in Austin and other cases. Rather, Citizens United held
that this justification is categorically forbidden: an “aberration” that
“interferes with the ‘open marketplace’ of ideas” and enables
“censorship . . . vast in its reach.” 274 The claim that quasi and
conventional campaign finance should be treated symmetrically
because of their distortive potential must therefore grapple with a
contrary Court ruling in addition to the other issues noted above.
5. Alignment. A final reason to regulate ordinary campaign
finance, which I and other scholars have explored elsewhere,275 is the
promotion of alignment between voters’ preferences and the
government’s outputs. On this account, the actions that elected officials
take, especially the policies they implement, should be congruent with
the desires of the electorate. Empirically, however, unrestricted
electoral funding is a powerful driver of misalignment. 276 It causes
legislators’ voting records and enacted laws to reflect the funders’
priorities while straying from those of regular constituents. 277
Therefore, the argument continues, the government has an interest in
limiting electoral funding in order to better align what voters want with
what the state does. Such restraints advance the democratic goal of a
polity that heeds the will of the people.
This logic extends to quasi campaign finance. As I showed earlier,
there is considerable evidence that nonelectoral, yet still political,
spending pushes the government’s outputs in the directions favored by
the spenders, but not necessarily by voters. Grassroots contacts with

273. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 381 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
274. Id. at 354–55 (quoting N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208
(2008)).
275. See generally Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance, supra note 24 (emphasizing
that an interest “of the gravest importance” is the alignment “between voters’ policy preferences
and their government’s policy outputs”); Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, supra note
178 (same); Lawrence Lessig, What an Originalist Would Understand “Corruption” to Mean, 102
CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2014) (same).
276. See, e.g., Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance, supra note 24, at 1467–79.
277. See id.
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legislators paid for by quasi campaign finance, for example, make them
significantly more likely to vote for the bills being advocated,
regardless of the bills’ popularity with their constituents.278 Likewise,
the greater the state-level activity of AFP—the country’s most prolific
spender on quasi campaign finance—the more probable it is that a state
curtails public-sector union bargaining rights and declines to expand
Medicaid. 279 By comparison, “variations in public views ha[ve] little
relevance” to the adoption of these policies, which are “as readily
enacted in states . . . where people express[] high levels of support . . .
as they [are] in states . . . where people [are] much less supportive.”280
If the misalignment produced by conventional campaign finance
can justify its regulation, then, arguably, so can that yielded by quasi
campaign finance. The reasoning is identical for the latter activity.
Nonelectoral, yet still political, spending drives a wedge between
voters’ preferences and the government’s outputs. This noncongruence
is troubling from a democratic perspective. Accordingly, the state may
intervene to prevent the noncongruence from arising. Through its
intervention, the state furthers its compelling interest in a properly
aligned political system.
The argument that quasi and ordinary campaign finance should be
equated because of their misaligning potential, moreover, avoids two
of the pitfalls of the analogous claim about their distortive capacity.
First, the misaligning potential, unlike the distortive capacity, is real.
Empirically, quasi campaign finance does appear to induce elected
officials to behave in ways opposed by their constituents, 281 while it
does not seem to exert much influence on public opinion.282 Second,
the dilemma of how to choose a baseline relative to which distortion
may be measured does not exist for misalignment. Unlike distortion,
misalignment comes with a normatively attractive benchmark built in:
voters’ attitudes on specific issues and overarching ideologies. They are
the reference point for determining whether, and how far, the
government’s outputs have diverged from where they ought to be.283

278. See supra notes 157–60 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 161–64 and accompanying text.
280. Skocpol & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 21, at 694.
281. See supra notes 157–67 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 144–48 and accompanying text.
283. There are still some baseline-setting issues, however, with the alignment approach. See
Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance, supra note 24, at 1434–41 (discussing them in
detail); Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, supra note 178, at 304–13 (same).
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However, the argument based on misaligning potential remains
vulnerable to the slippery-slope objection. Other kinds of political
communication, beyond quasi and regular campaign finance, are also
able to create noncongruence between politicians and their
constituents. In particular, Hertel-Fernandez found that it is not just
AFP’s strength in a state that drives restrictions on public-sector union
bargaining rights and refusals to expand Medicaid. Rather, these
unpopular policies are linked to the clout of the entire Koch network,
including the reach of ALEC and the budgets of SPN think tanks.284
This result suggests that the circulation of conservative bills to
legislators, and the publication of right-wing white papers, could be
regulated as well on a misalignment theory. But this is a disturbing
conclusion since these activities have always been viewed as part of
public discourse. If they are moved to the electoral domain instead,
then that zone becomes overly capacious, and the public sphere unduly
narrow.
Nor has the Supreme Court ever endorsed the argument based on
misaligning potential. The Court has used some similar language, like
its passage in McConnell calling it “troubling to a functioning
democracy” when “officeholders . . . decide issues not on . . . the desires
of their constituencies, but according to the wishes of those who have
made large financial contributions.” 285 But the Court has never
explicitly held that the promotion of alignment is a legitimate
governmental interest that may justify some restriction of political
speech. To date, it is only scholars who have advanced this position.
C. Other Assignments
Whether to assign quasi campaign finance to the electoral domain
or to public discourse, then, is quite a difficult question. There are
sensible reasons to pair quasi and conventional campaign finance: they
share several functional features and so may be substituted for each
other, and they are both capable of corrupting officeholders, distorting
public opinion, and misaligning the government’s outputs from voters’
preferences. On the other hand, even if slippery-slope claims are often
284. See HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, supra note 162, at 182 (looking at public-sector union
bargaining rights); id. at 202 (Medicaid expansion); see also Hertel-Fernandez, Skocpol & Lynch,
supra note 4, at 254 (same).
285. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558
U.S. 310 (2010); see also, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000) (discussing
“the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors”—and
not compliant enough with their constituents’ desires).
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overstated,286 they have real force here. If quasi campaign finance may
be placed in the electoral domain—despite being nonelectoral by
definition—then so, perhaps, may be even more political speech. But
then the public sphere starts to shrink beyond recognition.
1. Regulable Public Discourse. Are there classificatory options for
quasi campaign finance that are not so fraught? There are at least two
other possibilities, but they pose their own problems. The first of these
is situating quasi campaign finance in public discourse—but not
deeming it unregulable due to this location. It is true that governmental
restrictions of public discourse are usually unconstitutional because
they interfere with the free formation of public opinion. As the Court
has declared, the First Amendment “is designed and intended to
remove governmental restraints from the arena of public
discussion.” 287 “[G]overnmental regulation of this crucial process”
therefore cannot “be exercised consistent with First Amendment
guarantees.”288
However, some prominent theories of public discourse would
allow some limitation of quasi campaign finance. For instance,
Professor Owen Fiss (echoing philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn289)
has argued that the point of public discourse is not to safeguard
individual autonomy but rather to “allow[] people to [deliberate]
intelligently and freely, aware of all the options and in possession of all
the relevant information.” 290 Public discourse should thus be
“protected when (and only when)” it “enrich[es] public debate,” not
“because it is an exercise of autonomy.”291 From this perspective, quasi
campaign finance could be regulated so long as the regulation resulted
in a more informed populace better able to make judgments on public
issues. This is certainly conceivable. Say that a package of
interventions 292 yielded somewhat less libertarian spending by the
Koch network, and somewhat more communication advocating higher

286. See generally Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1026 (2003) (noting the weaknesses of many slippery-slope claims).
287. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
288. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974); see also, e.g., POST, supra
note 17, at 74 (“[C]ourts may properly prevent the state from restricting public discourse . . . .”).
289. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 32, at 25 (“What is essential is not that everyone shall
speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said.”).
290. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1410 (1986).
291. Id. at 1411.
292. For a discussion of potential regulations of quasi campaign finance, see infra Part III.
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taxes and greater redistribution. Presented with more balanced
information, people might have more illuminating exchanges about
these topics and, ultimately, reach better decisions about them. In this
case, the interventions would further the mission of public discourse,
not undermine it.
Alternatively, Post has claimed that we value public discourse
because it is a source of “democratic legitimation.” 293 When people
“participate in the ongoing dialogue that constitutes public opinion,”
they come to “believe that government is potentially responsive to
their views.” 294 These subjective feelings of responsiveness cause
“government [to] enjoy democratic legitimacy [because] it carries the
trust and confidence of its people.” 295 On this theory, too, the
regulation of quasi campaign finance could be allowed if it bolstered
people’s faith in government. And again, this scenario is plausible on
its face. People might feel less alienated from government—more
confident that government is listening to them—if a handful of
billionaires were not able to dominate quasi campaign finance with
their idiosyncratic messages. People might be even more sure that
government is responsive to their views if they were offered grants to
make these views known. This subsidization of quasi campaign finance
is one of the regulatory options I address below in Part III.296
Both of these accounts of public discourse, though, require us to
believe in the state’s competence and good faith. According to Fiss,
who decides if a limit on quasi campaign finance will enrich the public
debate? In Post’s model, who makes the call that a restriction will
enhance people’s feelings of responsiveness? The answer in both cases
is the government.297 But the government might be bad at these jobs; it
might misjudge regulations’ implications for the vibrancy of public

293. POST, supra note 17, at 49.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. See infra Part III. Even though Post believes that public discourse is generally
unregulable, see POST, supra note 17, at 74, he concedes that limits are valid if “uncontrolled
expenditures threaten to undermine the electoral integrity of our representative system.” Id. at
91. In this case, “we also face a potential loss of democratic legitimation if we choose to do
nothing.” Id.; see also James Weinstein, Campaign Finance Reform and the First Amendment: An
Introduction, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1093 (2002) (pointing out that public discourse could be
regulated if doing so “would result in a net gain in legitimation”).
297. Fiss is quite open about his view that “the state can enrich as much as it constricts public
debate.” Fiss, supra note 290, at 1415. Likewise, Post explains that “government regulations” can
“advance the goal of sustaining public confidence that elections select officials who are attentive
to public opinion.” POST, supra note 17, at 91.
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debate or for people’s subjective attitudes. Even worse, the
government might not approach these tasks benevolently; instead, it
might use its jurisdiction over public discourse to exclude certain
categories of speakers or speech. If, as the Court has said, the First
Amendment is “[p]remised on mistrust of governmental power,”298 we
might reasonably worry about conceptions of public discourse that ask
us to accept the state’s skill and goodwill.
Furthermore, there is another understanding of public discourse—
probably the dominant understanding in the doctrine—that focuses
above all on people’s freedom to participate in it. What really matters,
on this view, is people’s “liberty to discuss publicly . . . all matters of
public concern,” 299 not whether this discussion ultimately results in
richer public debate or greater democratic legitimation. This theory
plainly would not authorize restraints on quasi campaign finance. Yes,
such curbs might have consequences that some would think desirable.
But these positive effects would be beside the point. No ends could
justify means that abridge anyone’s ability to engage in public
discourse.
2. A Policymaking Domain. The second classificatory possibility
is to assign quasi campaign finance neither to the electoral domain nor
to public discourse, but rather to a different specialized sphere: one
dedicated to the formulation and implementation of governmental
policy. Courts and scholars have not previously recognized a
policymaking domain, but one may readily be imagined. Its
instrumental purpose would be the enactment of sound laws and
regulations—measures that promote the public’s welfare and reflect its
preferences. This is a different goal from that of public discourse,
whether it is conceived in Fiss’s, Post’s, or the Court’s usual terms. This
is also an inherently governmental objective since only the state may
ratify legally binding policy. This governmental nature is important
because, under the partitionist theory, only the state’s valid aims may
justify the creation of specialized domains separate from public
discourse.300

298. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010).
299. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940); see also, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968) (noting the “public interest in having free and unhindered debate on
matters of public importance”); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“[A] major purpose
of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”).
300. See supra notes 192–208 and accompanying text (discussing the partitionist theory).
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Strong evidence that a policymaking domain already (implicitly)
exists comes from the procedures used in legislation and regulation. In
an assembly, legislators and witnesses called to testify cannot speak
whenever they want, for as long as they wish, or on whatever topics
they like. Rather, their speech is comprehensively controlled by
recognition requirements, time limits, and germaneness conditions.301
This is so even though the speech is quintessentially political. Likewise,
parties interested in expressing their views on draft regulations are not
free to contact agencies whenever and however they choose. Instead,
they must comply with rules restricting their comments to certain time
periods and insisting on the disclosure of identifying information. 302
This, again, despite the classically political character of the
communication.
Quasi campaign finance, then, could be placed in a policymaking
domain along with legislative and regulatory speech. Like those types
of messages, nonelectoral, yet still political, spending seeks the
enactment or amendment of laws or regulations. Indeed, that is its
whole point, and what distinguishes it from electoral spending. With
quasi campaign finance, policy change (or preservation) is the overt
goal, and elections are the indirect mechanism used to achieve it. The
legal ramifications of this designation would also be far-reaching. If
quasi campaign finance were part of a specialized policymaking sphere,
then it could be managed in the service of the sphere’s purpose: the
production of good public policy. Various kinds of checks might then
become valid, even if they would be unlawful for generic public
discourse.
Yet there is at least one significant difference between quasi
campaign finance and legislative and regulatory speech. The latter are
directed
at
policymakers—fellow
legislators
and
agency
administrators, respectively—while nonelectoral, yet still political,
spending necessarily targets voters.303 Voters, however, do not make
decisions in our system, at least outside the context of ballot initiatives.
Quasi campaign finance may therefore be an awkward fit for a
301. See, e.g., RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 116th Cong., Rule XVI (2019),
https://rules.house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/documents/116-House-Rules-Clerk.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YQU2-PJAN].
302. Although different agencies follow different commenting procedures, they all impose
restrictions in fulfilling their obligation to “give interested persons an opportunity to participate
in the rulemaking through submission of written data, views, or arguments.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(c)
(2018).
303. See supra Part I.A.
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policymaking domain since those who run the domain are not its
audience. Rather, those managers are reached only through the
intervening steps of the constituents who actually receive the
communications.
It is also notable that legislative speech is subject to much more
draconian limits than regulatory speech. This is probably because
legislative speech takes place under conditions of scarcity while
regulatory speech does not.304 With legislative speech, there is only so
much time to hear from speakers on the assembly floor, whereas with
regulatory speech, the agency can process all the comments that are
submitted. Of the two, quasi campaign finance more closely resembles
regulatory speech. More ads can always be aired; more canvassers can
always go door to door; more rallies can always be held. One actor’s
nonelectoral spending does not necessarily come at the expense of
another’s. In that case, though, the restrictions applicable to regulatory
speech are more indicative of the constraints that could be imposed on
quasi campaign finance if it were assigned to a policymaking domain.
And those restrictions are not particularly onerous—certainly a far cry
from Robert’s Rules of Order.
The slippery-slope objection must make one last appearance as
well. If quasi campaign finance may be situated in a policymaking
domain, despite not being directed at policymakers or occurring under
conditions of scarcity, then so may be fundraising solicitations, think
tank reports, editorials, and so on. All of these messages, too, have
policy aspirations, are heard by audiences other than legislators and
regulators, and may be conveyed without cannibalizing other views.
But if a policymaking domain is elastic enough to fit these kinds of
political communication, then not enough space is left for public
discourse. Once more, a realm of specialized speech ends up annexing
large swathes of the public sphere.
III. THE REGULATION OF QUASI CAMPAIGN FINANCE
In the preceding Part, I considered whether quasi campaign
finance may constitutionally be regulated. Under the partitionist
theory of the First Amendment, the answer hinges largely on the zone
of speech in which the activity is located. If nonelectoral, yet still
political, spending is deemed part of a specialized electoral or
304. Cf. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 367, 376, 400–01 (1969) (upholding
regulations on broadcasters under the Federal Communications Commission’s “fairness
doctrine” in part because “broadcast frequencies constitute[] a scarce resource”).
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policymaking domain, then it may be limited to accomplish the
domain’s objectives. Conversely, if this sort of spending is situated in
public discourse, then it is presumptively unregulable, at least per the
Court’s usual view of generic political communication.
In this Part, I assume that quasi campaign finance may be
restricted and turn to the question that logically follows: How should it
be curbed in order to realize goals like the prevention of corruption,
distortion, and misalignment and the enactment of sound public
policy? I address three types of regulations: (1) ceilings on
nonelectoral, yet still political, spending in the form of contribution or
expenditure caps; (2) floors for the activity in the form of public
subsidies; and (3) disclosure requirements for the sources, amounts,
and uses of quasi campaign finance. Of these three categories, I find
the latter two preferable: more practical, more consistent with
American tradition, and still potentially quite effective. As this verdict
reveals, I also focus on the regulations’ normative appeal while
commenting on their constitutionality only in passing.
A. Ceilings
Beginning with ceilings, both contribution and expenditure limits
on quasi campaign finance are conceivable. A contribution limit might
bar a donor from giving more than a certain annual dollar amount to
an entity that plans to use the funds to pay for mass communications
“with regard to . . . the formulation, modification, or adoption of . . .
legislation” or a “rule, regulation, Executive order, or any other
[governmental] program, policy, or position.”305 The quoted language
is from the Lobbying Disclosure Act and nicely captures the range of
nonelectoral, yet still political, issues that could be the subjects of
messages to voters.306 Analogously, an expenditure limit might bar any
actor from spending more than a certain yearly sum on mass
communications about governmental policy. Policy would presumably
be defined the same way whether the money was disbursed via a
donation or a direct outlay.

305. 2 U.S.C. § 1602(8)(A)(i)–(ii) (2018).
306. However, the quoted language does not define mass communications with voters, nor
does it distinguish between mass communications that do and do not rely on electoral mechanisms
to be effective. See supra Part I.A (defining quasi campaign finance). Any actual legislation would
have to work out these issues. But they are not my concern here because I want to comment
generally on contribution and expenditure limits, not take a first pass at drafting them.
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An initial point about these restrictions is that there is no reason
to distinguish between contribution and expenditure limits. There is a
basis for treating these measures differently in the ordinary campaign
finance context. As the Court held in Buckley, contributions to
candidates are more valuable to them, and therefore more potentially
corruptive, than independent electoral expenditures on their behalf.307
But this logic does not transfer to the quasi campaign finance context.
This is because donations of nonelectoral money are necessarily made
to noncandidate entities such as nonprofit groups.308 These entities, of
course, cannot hold governmental office and so cannot exchange
official acts (or access or influence) for the money they receive.
Accordingly, there is no greater risk of corruption when a nonelectoral
dollar is given to another actor than when it is spent directly. Either
way, that dollar cannot make its way into a candidate’s coffers.309
It is also plain that, if they have any teeth, contribution and
expenditure limits on quasi campaign finance would reduce its volume.
Some would-be donors would be unable to give as much money as they
would like to some groups. Similarly, some would-be spenders would
be prevented from making all of their desired disbursements.310 To the
extent the current quantity of quasi campaign finance is problematic,
this decrease would be beneficial. In particular, if the amount of
spending on nonelectoral politics is correlated with the prevalence of
corruption, distortion, or misalignment, then less of this spending
would lead to fewer of these harms. The pool of funding responsible
for the problems would be partly drained.
It does not seem to me, however, that the trouble with quasi
campaign finance is its volume. In fact, extensive communication with
voters about nonelectoral politics has much to commend it, potentially
yielding a more informed electorate capable of making better policy
judgments. In my view, rather, the primary concern is the balance of
quasi campaign finance: the distribution of messages that are conveyed
307. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46 (1976) (per curiam) (“[I]ndependent advocacy
. . . does not presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to those
identified with large campaign contributions.”).
308. If the donations were made to candidates, of course, they would no longer be
nonelectoral.
309. Nor is there any reason to think that contributions of quasi campaign finance are more
distortive or misaligning than expenditures, or vice versa. A nonelectoral dollar that Steyer gives
to NextGen America seems as impactful as a nonelectoral dollar that he spends himself.
310. Cf. Briffault, Lobbying, supra note 223, at 113 (“Capping the amounts an individual or
group could spend either on hiring a lobbyist or on lobbying personally would cut directly into
the amount of lobbying . . . .”).
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to voters. It is when one side of a debate enjoys a large resource
advantage that fears about corruption, distortion, and misalignment
become more acute.311 In such an environment, corruptible candidates
find that most of the quids for which they may promise quos come from
the same ideological camp. Public opinion is also more likely to be
skewed when it is pressed hard from one direction but only faintly from
the other. And if elected officials veer toward the preferences of
nonelectoral spenders—thereby diverging from what voters want—
they probably veer further when the payors form a mostly unified bloc.
Contribution and expenditure limits on quasi campaign finance,
though, are a poor tool for promoting greater communicative
symmetry. They cannot promise that when the volume of nonelectoral
spending declines, its composition will be any different. Suppose, for
example, that a thousand conservative donors each currently give $1
million a year to the Koch network, and that five hundred liberal
donors annually write equally sized checks to the Democracy
Alliance. 312 Next, imagine that a $500,000 limit on quasi campaign
finance contributions is imposed. If this restriction cannot be
circumvented, then the Koch network’s and the DA’s budgets both will
fall by half. But their relative scale will be unaffected. The Koch
network will continue to spend twice as much as the DA in furtherance
of its right-wing agenda.313
The caveat about circumvention is also important. For two
reasons, ceilings on quasi campaign finance would likely be easier to
evade than regular campaign finance regulations. First, groups may
freely multiply, transforming one organization into several, while
candidates cannot. This means that if limits were levied on
nonelectoral, yet still political, contributions, groups could sidestep
them by splitting into a number of new entities. Donors who wanted to
give amounts above the thresholds could then divide their payments
among the array of sister organizations. 314 In contrast, this option is
311. Cf. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978) (suggesting that when
corporate advocacy “drown[s] out other points of view,” it may “threaten[] imminently to
undermine democratic processes”).
312. This is a reasonable approximation of reality. See supra notes 121–25 and accompanying
text.
313. Of course, if there were equal numbers of conservative and liberal donors, then each
side’s spending would be the same in this hypothetical. But that just means that contribution limits
could—not that they would—result in spending parity.
314. Aggregate limits on total annual quasi campaign finance donations could potentially stop
this sort of circumvention. See generally McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014) (plurality
opinion) (discussing the aggregate limits on contributions to candidates for federal office).
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unavailable to candidates. They cannot convert from a single seeker of
office into many.315 Caps on their receipts thus have more bite because
human beings, unlike artificial entities, are incapable of at-will
proliferation.
Second, there are probably more substitutes for nonelectoral than
for electoral funding. If contribution or expenditure limits were
enacted for quasi campaign finance, payors could simply switch to a
number of alternative activities: lobbying officeholders directly,
underwriting the work of think tanks or university centers, subsidizing
journalistic coverage, and so on. All of these activities are also
instruments for pursuing policy goals. 316 On the other hand, at least
before Citizens United, laws and norms blocked those wishing to
influence elections from fully deploying their resources to this end.
Laws capped their contributions to candidates, parties, and PACs. And
norms restrained them from spending much money directly or from
creating vehicles like super PACs that could make unlimited
expenditures. 317 For several decades, the dike against excessive
electoral funding thus held, even though in theory it could have been
breached the whole time.
A final strike against contribution or expenditure limits on quasi
campaign finance is their sheer novelty. There is no modern American
tradition of restricting nonelectoral, yet still political, speech. To the
contrary, the Court has a consistent record of striking down such
constraints.318 Accordingly, even if they were permissible, ceilings on
quasi campaign finance would likely seem odd and discomfiting to
many observers. They would be a new feature on the legal landscape,
and one unlike the terrain’s current profile.

315. See id. at 201–02 (describing the FEC regulations that prevent candidates from benefiting
from single-candidate committees or from funds given to other entities but earmarked for them).
Federal law also “prohibit[s] donors from creating or controlling multiple affiliated political
committees,” thus blocking the spread of PACs to some degree. Id. at 201 (emphasis added)
(citing 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(5) (2012); 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(g)(4) (2012)). An equivalent antiproliferation rule could be imagined for groups engaging in quasi campaign finance.
316. The ready availability of these activities, of course, is what gives force to the slipperyslope objection to regulating quasi campaign finance. See supra Parts II.B–C.
317. See, e.g., Adam Bonica, Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Why
Hasn’t Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality?, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 103, 112 (2013) (showing the
lower (though still rising) share of campaign funding by the wealthy prior to Citizens United).
318. See supra notes 185–87 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558
U.S. 310, 369 (2010) (“Congress has no power to ban lobbying itself.”); Briffault, Anxiety, supra
note 45, at 164 (“[L]imits on lobbying expenditures, like limits on campaign expenditures, would
run straight into the First Amendment.”).
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B. Floors
Say that ceilings are a bad idea, here, because they do not
necessarily change the distribution of nonelectoral spending, they are
easy to circumvent, and they are legally unfamiliar. What about floors,
by which I mean public subsidies for quasi campaign finance? Such
subsidies could be configured in many ways, so to anchor the
discussion, I consider only one of them: a voucher program under
which each eligible voter would receive a small annual sum (for
example, $100), which could then be spent directly on nonelectoral
politics or donated to a group that would deploy it for this purpose.
Scholars have long urged this sort of program in the conventional
campaign finance context, 319 and Seattle recently became the first
jurisdiction to enact it. 320 I envision the same policy in the quasi
campaign finance context—except that no strings would be attached to
the vouchers. Eligible voters would not have to do anything to get
them, nor groups to be their recipients, beyond using them for quasi
campaign finance.321
Vouchers along these lines could reduce the risk of corruption by
adding many small nonelectoral spenders to the few big payors who
currently predominate. Take the hypothetical Democratic candidate in
the congressional district where NextGen America may spend $1
million to combat climate change.322 As noted above, this candidate has
a considerable incentive to promise quos—official acts, access,
influence—in return for this large quid. 323 But now assume that
vouchers are available and will result in an additional $1 million in
quasi campaign finance, paid for by dozens of groups and thousands of
voters. In this scenario, the candidate would have less reason to enter

319. See generally, e.g., ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 26 (proposing a voucher system for
electoral donations); Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public
Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1996) (same). Scholars have
also supported public financing in the direct lobbying context. See, e.g., Dorie Apollonio, Bruce
E. Cain & Lee Drutman, Access and Lobbying: Looking Beyond the Corruption Paradigm, 36
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 13, 46 (2008); Brian Galle, Charities in Politics: A Reappraisal, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1561 (2013); Gerken & Tausanovitch, supra note 223, at 87–90.
320. See Democracy Voucher Program, supra note 27.
321. In the conventional campaign finance context, voucher programs typically require
candidates to agree to a series of conditions in order to qualify for donations. See, e.g., Democracy
Voucher Program—I am a Candidate, SEATTLE.GOV, https://www.seattle.gov/democracyvoucher/
i-am-a-candidate [https://perma.cc/SR3C-3B4X] (noting that, to participate, Seattle candidates
must collect a number of qualifying contributions and signatures and abide by spending limits).
322. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
323. See id.
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into a corrupt transaction with NextGen America. Its potential
spending would still be valuable but would no longer carry the same
weight after being equaled by the voucher-enabled payments. Nor
would the candidate be motivated to make corrupt deals with the
holders or recipients of the vouchers. Their individual quids would be
too minor to warrant quos.
That this regime could limit distortion is even clearer. In a setting
where NextGen America is the only major spender on nonelectoral
politics, its environmental message might skew public opinion, in the
sense of shifting it from what it would have been absent the spending.
But if NextGen America’s advocacy were supplemented by many more
voices—some sympathetic, others hostile, and still others advancing
unrelated positions—people’s views would likely be more resistant to
change. Public opinion would then be shaped by an array of
perspectives, not pushed inexorably in the same direction by a single
actor.
Quasi campaign finance vouchers could improve alignment as
well. When NextGen America is the main nonelectoral spender,
politicians may feel pressure to back its preferred policies. If these
policies are more liberal than most voters would like, then a gap may
emerge between the electorate’s views and representatives’ positions.
But if quasi campaign finance were paid for by groups and voters across
the ideological spectrum, then politicians’ calculations might be quite
different. In that case, they might stop parroting NextGen America’s
stances and start reflecting the attitudes, now backed by the vouchers,
of the general public.
A common objection to all public financing proposals is cost.
There are more than 200 million eligible voters in the United States,324
so if 10 percent of them (likely a generous estimate325) were to use a
$100 voucher each year, the program’s annual price tag would be
around $2 billion. This is real money, though still a pittance in the
324. See Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2018, Table 1:
Reported Voting and Registration, by Sex and Single Years of Age: November 2018, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/voting-andregistration/p20-583.html [https://perma.cc/MD5K-9EM5]
(reporting almost 229 million American citizens over the age of eighteen).
325. In Seattle, only 3.3 percent of residents used their vouchers in the 2017 election. See
Sarah Kliff, Seattle’s Radical Plan To Fight Big Money in Politics, VOX (Nov. 5, 2018), https:/
/www.vox.com/2018/11/5/17058970/seattle-democracy-vouchers [https://perma.cc/3CFE-H6DJ].
A low voucher use rate raises the issue of representativeness: voucher users might be different
(older, whiter, wealthier) than eligible voters, in which case vouchers might be less effective at
preventing distortion and misalignment.
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context of a federal budget now approaching $4.5 trillion.326 Also recall
that the best estimate of the existing volume of quasi campaign finance
is about $1 billion per year.327 This means that, at the price of a tiny
fraction of the federal budget, public financing of nonelectoral politics
could roughly double its private financing. Public funds could thus
drown out private funds in this area—and, with them, the democratic
harms they sometimes cause.
Quasi campaign finance vouchers might also raise First
Amendment hackles because they would subsidize some speech
(nonelectoral, yet still political, communication) but not other speech
(electoral messages, non-political messages, and so on). 328 But this
differentiation would not be on the basis of viewpoint. No policy
perspectives would be endorsed or disapproved. In this circumstance,
the Court has long held that speech subsidies are “consistent with the
First Amendment” because they “respect[] the principle of viewpoint
neutrality.”329 For precisely this reason, in the 1983 case of Regan v.
Taxation with Representation, the Court upheld the federal law
deeming contributions tax-deductible if they are made to 501(c)(3)
groups but not if they are made to other nonprofit groups.330 This tax
deductibility is a selective subsidy, but no constitutional problem arises
when “Congress subsidizes some speech, but not all speech” without
“discriminat[ing] invidiously in its subsidies.”331
Lastly, to be viable, quasi campaign finance vouchers would have
to work out some tricky definitional issues. If an eligible voter decides
to spend (not to donate) her voucher, on which activities may she use
the money? Similarly, what may (and may not) a recipient group do

326. See The Federal Budget in 2019: An Infographic, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (Apr. 2020),
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56324 [https://perma.cc/VK5P-G8VG].
327. See supra Part I.D.
328. Another, more radical argument might be that vouchers violate the First Amendment
because they force taxpayers to pay for political speech they do not support. Cf. Janus v. Am.
Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2459–60 (2018) (striking down arrangements
under which “public employees are forced to subsidize a union, even if they . . . strongly object to
the positions the union takes”). But see Elster v. City of Seattle, 444 P.3d 590, 592 (Wash. 2019)
(rejecting this argument and upholding Seattle’s voucher program).
329. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 234 (2000); see also,
e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995) (“[R]eaffirm[ing]
the requirement of viewpoint neutrality in the Government’s provision of financial benefits.”).
330. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983).
331. Id. at 548; see also Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (upholding the
“[n]ondiscriminatory denial of deduction from gross income to sums expended to promote or
defeat legislation”).
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with its funds? 332 And what happens if a recipient group pays for
electoral, nonelectoral, and nonpolitical communications? Does the
group have to segregate its quasi campaign finance from the rest of its
budget so that the vouchers flow only into the former? These issues are
too fine-grained to explore here. But it is not obvious how to address
them, and their proper resolution would plainly take time and care.
C. Transparency
Disclosure is the final regulation of quasi campaign finance I
discuss. As with public subsidies, several measures could be devised to
compel the release of information about nonelectoral, yet still political,
spending. 333 But in the interest of brevity, I comment on only one
proposal: extending BCRA’s disclosure requirements for
electioneering communication to quasi campaign finance. BCRA
mandates that sources of electioneering communication identify
themselves: “[e]very person who makes a disbursement . . . in an
aggregate amount in excess of $10,000 during any calendar year.” 334
The statute further directs the quantities of electioneering
communication to be made public: “[t]he amount of each disbursement
of more than $200.” 335 The law instructs as well that the uses of
electioneering communication be revealed: “[t]he elections to which
the [disbursements] pertain and the names . . . of the candidates
identified.”336
I have in mind analogous disclosure requirements for quasi
campaign finance. Actors who annually spend more than a certain total
figure—whether they are individuals, corporations, unions, nonprofit
332. A related issue is that some charities currently use most of their budgets to pay for
fundraising rather than programs or services. See, e.g., 10 Charities Overpaying Their For-Profit
Fundraisers, CHARITY NAVIGATOR, https://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=topten.
detail&listid=28 [https://perma.cc/X5ED-8KHT]. So would groups remain eligible for quasi
campaign finance vouchers if they spent most of their proceeds on soliciting still more vouchers?
333. Another possibility is requiring disclaimers for nonelectoral, yet still political,
communications identifying the messages’ funders. Cf. 52 U.S.C. § 30120(d)(2) (2018) (providing
for such disclaimers for electioneering communication); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310,
366–71 (2010) (upholding these disclaimers). Still another idea is applying the disclosure
requirement for grassroots lobbying to all taxpayers, not only 501(c)(3) groups that engage in
lobbying. See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 620 (1954) (interpreting a lobbying statute to
require disclosure of not only “direct pressures” but also those exerted “through an artificially
stimulated letter campaign”); Briffault, Anxiety, supra note 45, at 187 (observing that “most state
lobbying disclosure laws do cover some grassroots lobbying activity”).
334. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(1).
335. Id. § 30104(f)(2)(C).
336. Id. § 30104(f)(2)(D).
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groups, or other entities—would thus have to file reports with the
government. These reports would list the amounts of nonelectoral, yet
still political, disbursements. The reports would also specify the topics
and modes of the outlays: the policy areas they involve and the means
of communication for which they pay. A sample AFP entry, for
instance, might state that the organization spent some sum on door-todoor canvassing in a state in opposition to that state’s Medicaid
expansion.337
An obvious benefit of such disclosure is the prevention of
corruption. As explained earlier, quasi campaign finance has at least
some value for candidates.338 They may therefore be willing to trade
official acts, access, or influence for the spending. At present, if such
corrupt exchanges are consummated, no one necessarily knows about
them. The quid does not have to be revealed, making it difficult to find
out if it has been swapped for a quo. But if quasi campaign finance had
to be disclosed, a spotlight would shine on nonelectoral, yet still
political, disbursements. In the face of this publicity, both candidates
and spenders would be less likely to make corrupt deals. They could
not be as sure as before that their arrangements would stay secret. As
the Court observed in Buckley, where it upheld FECA’s disclosure
requirements, “exposure may discourage those who would use money
for improper purposes.” 339 “A public armed with information . . . is
better able to detect any . . . special favors that may be given in
return.”340
A subtler effect of disclosure could be to promote greater
communicative symmetry—and thus to curb corruption, distortion,
and misalignment in a single stroke. If one actor currently outspends
337. For a similar proposal, focusing on “disclosure of all donors to social welfare
organizations that engage in political activity,” see Roger Colinvaux, Social Welfare and Political
Organizations: Ending the Plague of Inconsistency, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 481, 501
(2018).
338. See supra Part II.B.3.
339. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (per curiam).
340. Id.; see also, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010) (noting that, thanks to
disclosure, “citizens can see whether elected officials are in the pocket of so-called moneyed
interests” (internal quotation marks omitted)); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003)
(holding that disclosure requirements “deter[] actual corruption and avoid[] any appearance
thereof”), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). That said, I agree with other
scholars that “disclosure is not a strong anticorruption tool” because it merely “shed[s] a light”
on potentially corrupt transactions rather than directly stopping them. Richard L. Hasen, Chill
Out: A Qualified Defense of Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws in the Internet Age, 27 J.L. &
POL. 557, 567 (2012) [hereinafter Hasen, Chill Out] (citing Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance
Disclosure 2.0, 9 Election L.J. 273, 287 (2010)).
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all other parties on quasi campaign finance, the other parties may not
be aware of the imbalance. They may guess at, but they cannot be sure
of, the volume of the first actor’s advertisements, rallies, door knocks,
and so on. Oblivious to the extent to which they are outgunned, the
other parties may fail to deploy all the resources at their disposal. They
may not realize these assets are necessary in the debate.
But if the other parties knew they were being outspent—thanks to
disclosure—they could respond more forcefully. In Professor Anita
Krishnakumar’s words, “greater transparency . . . could lead to more
balanced political participation by interests on both sides of an issue,
as opposing groups seek to match or ‘check’ each other’s efforts in true
Madisonian fashion.” 341 And if the communicative environment did
become more symmetric, then for the reasons discussed above, fears
about corruption, distortion, and misalignment might all recede. 342
Quids with value for candidates would no longer be clustered in a
single policy camp. Pressure on public opinion would be exerted in
both directions. And officeholders would have dueling incentives after
battle was joined, with both combatants (not just one side) inducing
them to take certain stances.
The constitutionality of disclosure, furthermore, is reasonably
clear. In Buckley, the Court upheld FECA’s requirements that
campaign contributions and express electoral advocacy be made
public. 343 The Court also rebuffed First Amendment challenges to
BCRA’s requirements that electioneering communication be
accompanied by disclaimers and then summarized in reports—twice, in
both McConnell 344 and Citizens United. 345 The same result would
probably follow for the disclosure of quasi campaign finance. Such
disclosure, like that of ordinary campaign finance, would impose some

341. Krishnakumar, supra note 45, at 517; see also Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, What Is This
“Lobbying” That We Are So Worried About?, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 485, 559 (2008)
(“D]isclosure will better inform competing interest groups about these activities, and so lead to
greater and more equally matched interest group competition.”).
342. See supra Parts III.A–B.
343. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 60–84.
344. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 194–202.
345. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–71. The Court has also held that “[i]dentification of
the source of advertising may be required as a means of disclosure” even in direct democratic
elections not including candidates. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 n.32
(1978). The Court has further approved the disclosure of “information from those who for hire
attempt to influence legislation or who collect or spend funds for that purpose.” United States v.
Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954).
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burden on speech and association rights.346 But this burden would be
justified by the compelling interests served by the policy: informing the
public about who is spending money on nonelectoral politics, and
combating corruption, distortion, and misalignment.347
A proviso is that, in its cases about the disclosure of regular
campaign finance, the Court has held that particular plaintiffs may
succeed in as-applied suits if they show a heightened risk of
“harassment or retaliation.”348 The same exception would likely apply
in the quasi campaign finance context. So, if there were evidence that
a specific spender on nonelectoral politics would face reprisals if her
activity were made public, this spender might be able to keep her
disbursements confidential. However, this loophole has been a minor
one historically under FECA and BCRA,349 and its infrequent usage
would presumably persist here. Most payors of quasi campaign finance
simply would not be able to link the disclosure of their outlays to
significant adverse consequences.
CONCLUSION
In the legal academy, the study of money and power continues to
focus, as it has for generations, on conventional campaign finance. Out
in the world, though, America’s richest and most politically active
individuals—the Koch brothers, Steyer, Bloomberg, and the like—are
increasingly turning to another tool to influence the political process:
346. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366 (observing that “[d]isclaimer and disclosure
requirements may burden the ability to speak”).
347. Other scholars have also noted the possibility of more aggressive disclosure
requirements. See Richard Briffault, Updating Disclosure for the New Era of Independent
Spending, 27 J.L. & POL. 683, 702–03 (2012) (“[T]here is a good argument that even broader
definitions of . . . speech [to be disclosed] than BCRA’s ‘electioneering communication’ are
constitutional.”); Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Easy Case for Disclosure of Contributions
and Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 3 ELECTION L.J. 251, 257 (2004) (“If [BCRA’s]
disclosure requirement is constitutional, why not a disclosure requirement in ballot measure
elections?”).
348. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68; see also, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 367, 370; McConnell,
540 U.S. at 198–99. Also, as throughout this Part, I assume that quasi and regular campaign
finance have the same legal status. If quasi campaign finance were treated as generic political
speech, then its mandatory disclosure would be more dubious. See supra note 186 and
accompanying text.
349. All such as-applied claims failed in Buckley, McConnell, and Citizens United. They only
succeeded in Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Committee, 459 U.S. 87, 100 (1982), where
the Socialist Workers Party established a “reasonable probability” of “threats, harassment, and
reprisals” due to the disclosure required by an Ohio law. See also Hasen, Chill Out, supra note
340, at 563 (summarizing the literature showing that “evidence of harassment of campaign finance
contributors and spenders these days is sparse indeed”).
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quasi campaign finance, the funding of nonelectoral communications
with voters that nevertheless rely on an electoral mechanism to be
effective. In this Article, I have described the little that is known about
quasi campaign finance, much of which is hidden from public scrutiny.
I have also weighed the arguments for and against treating quasi and
ordinary campaign finance identically for First Amendment purposes.
In my view, the legal status of quasi campaign finance is one of the most
challenging issues in constitutional law. And I have evaluated several
ways in which quasi campaign finance could be regulated (assuming it
is, in fact, regulable). Ceilings on the activity seem unwise to me, but
public subsidies and disclosure both promise substantial democratic
benefits at little First Amendment cost.
I want to close the Article with a call, familiar in these settings, for
additional academic research. The narrower objective of this future
work should be to further analyze quasi campaign finance: to learn
more about its empirical properties, to probe its legal status more
deeply, and to consider in more detail how it could be regulated. The
broader aim of the literature, though, should be to remember that
American politics is a vast, sprawling edifice, which affluent actors seek
to penetrate using every technique they can think of. Regular campaign
finance is one of these modes of entry. So is quasi campaign finance.
But there are many more ways in which wealth tries to sway
governmental policy, and scholars should examine them all. This
relationship between money and power is the field’s true subject, of
which quasi and conventional campaign finance are merely facets.

